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HOW TO DO THINGS WITH SIGNS: SEMIOTICS IN
LEGAL THEORY, PRACTICE, AND EDUCATION
Harold Anthony Lloyd *
INTRODUCTION
Discussing federal statutes, Justice Scalia tells us that “[t]he
stark reality is that the only thing that one can say for sure was
agreed to by both houses and the president (on signing the bill) is
the text of the statute. The rest is legal fiction.”1
How should we take this claim? If we take “text” to mean the
printed text, that text without more is just a series of marks.
Agreement on a series of marks without more has no meaning in
itself. In struggling with Justice Scalia’s remarks, we thus must
ask whether on the face of these remarks he has committed the
fallacy of conflating signifiers of meaning with meaning itself.
Legislators do not agree simply on certain ink marks but on what
they believe those ink marks signify.2 Their duty is to legislate,
not to produce mere marks of ink.
If we instead take “text” to embody something off the page,
such as the “meaning” of the series of marks at issue, what is that
meaning and how do we know that all the legislators “agreed” on
that “meaning”? The series of marks itself cannot prove such
unanimity, much less any specific meaning. Even if we take such
off-the-page text as referring to words with standard or dictionary

* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. The title of this Article
pays homage to J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina
Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975). I would like to thank my research assistants Laura Jordan and
Blake Davis for their careful review and comments. Any shortcomings are of course my
own.
1. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 376 (2012).
2. Justice Scalia no doubt understands that the meaning is not in the ink itself. He,
for example, allows for the correction of scrivener’s errors in certain cases. Id. at 234–39.
He also acknowledges the role of context in determining meaning. See id. at 16, 20, 33.
However, he would restrict use of such critical context as legislative history. Id. at 369–90.
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meanings, we know that words have multiple such meanings
(“left,” for example, can mean, among other things, a direction or
the past tense of “leave”). A series of marks referring to a series of
words in itself thus does not tell us which standard meanings
were in the heads of legislators when they read (if they did) drafts
of the bill.3
In struggling with Justice Scalia’s claim, we have necessarily
delved into semiotics (i.e., the “general theory of signs”4) by noting
that meaningful ink marks signify a meaning beyond themselves.
The meaning is thus not in the ink but in what the ink signifies.
As discussed below, a meaningful ink mark is a “signifier” of
meaning (the “signified”).
As this example shows, understanding how signifiers of signs
function is critical to good judging and lawyering. We risk error if
we look only at the signifiers which have no meaning in themselves apart from what they signify. Our task instead is to seek
the signified, which, again, lies beyond the signifier.5
Additionally, a failure to understand how signs function can
limit legal analysis and rhetoric by focusing on words to the detriment of other signs. As we shall see below, words are just one
type of sign, and legal analysis and rhetoric are therefore greatly
impoverished if we ignore other sign types. Consistent with such
impoverishment, we often hear that words are a lawyer’s tools.
Rather than words alone, this Article will claim that signs in
their vast array (including, but not limited to, words) are the lawyer’s fundamental tools.6
This Article therefore broadly explores semiotics through a
lawyer’s lens, hopefully simplifying as much as possible much of
the complex, divergent, and, frankly, sometimes baffling terminology used by those who explore semiotics. This Article will first
3. Thus, we would also want to question Justice Scalia’s claim that “a majority [of
legislators] has undeniably agreed on the final language that passes into law. That is all
they have agreed on . . . .” Id. at 393.
4. CHARLES MORRIS, SIGNIFICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONS
OF SIGNS AND VALUES 1 (1st ed. 1964).
5. I have challenged naïve textualism elsewhere and will therefore not explore that
specific issue in detail in this Article. See generally Harold A. Lloyd, Law’s “Way of Words”:
Pragmatics and Textualist Error, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 221 (2016).
6. Signs are, of course, all others’ tools as well. As Charles Sanders Peirce notes, and
as I hope this Article will help demonstrate, “the universe . . . is perfused with signs, if it is
not composed exclusively of signs.” 5 & 6 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS
OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 5.448 n.1 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1960).
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continue below with a general definition of signs and the related
notion of intentionality. It will then address the structure and
concomitants of signs, the nature of speech acts that are of interest to lawyers, the sign classifications used in legal analysis and
rhetoric, the role of signs in careful legal thought and good legal
rhetoric, the unfolding of the signified and the fixation of meaning debate, the semiotics of speaker vs. reader meaning, and some
brief reflections on semiotics and the First Amendment. Finally,
this Article also provides an Appendix with further terms and
concepts helpful to lawyers exploring semiotics.
I hope this Article’s broad overview of semiotics underscores
the vital importance of semiotics in law and in legal education reform. I also hope this Article inspires readers and legal education
reformers to explore the vast worlds of semiotics that elude the
page constraints of a general overview.
I. DEFINITION AND FUNCTION OF SIGNS, SEMIOTICS, AND
RELATED TERMS
Given the many interrelated parts of semiotics, one must make
a judgment call as to where to begin. My judgment call is to begin
with the definition of a sign and to build from there.
A. Definition of Sign
A “sign” consists of a co-related signifier and signified, where
the signifier is used to “represent” “something else,”7 i.e., the signified.8 Or as Eco puts it, “The sign is usually considered as a correlation between a signifier and a signified (or between expression and content) and therefore as an action between pairs.”9
Thus, one might use the word “monarch” (the signifier) to signify
a certain butterfly (the signified). In such a case, their co-relation
as signifier and signified would thus be a sign. I explore in more

7. See 1 & 2 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS
PEIRCE 2.227–32 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1960). In Peircean terms, a signifier can also be said to be “something which stands to somebody for something in some
respect or capacity.” Id. at 2.228.
8. Not everyone agrees with the two-part structure of signs adopted here. For a brief
table of various conceptions of the basic structure of signs, see WINFRIED NÖTH,
HANDBOOK OF SEMIOTICS 88 (1995).
9. UMBERTO ECO, SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 1 (1984).
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detail in Part II the nature and interrelation of a signifier and a
signified.
One should take care at the outset not to confuse “signs” (i.e.,
co-relations of signifiers and signifieds as discussed above) with
just the “signifiers” involved. Such confusion is all too easy in ordinary language. For example, we might speak of a stop “sign” at
an intersection. However, semiotically speaking, that physical object is a signifier of an obligation to stop, and the sign involved
here is the co-relation of such signifier and the obligation to stop
to which that signifier refers. This is the same relation that we
saw, again, in the sign involving the word “monarch” as signifier
and the butterfly as signified. Unfortunately, in semiotic literature, the term “sign” can be used for “signifier,”10 and the reader
must therefore take care when reading such literature to substitute “signifier” for “sign” where appropriate.11
B. Signs and Intentionality
Since signs involve signifiers that point to something else,
signs involve what philosophers call “intentionality.” Intentionality recognizes that “[o]ur beliefs, thoughts, wishes, dreams, and
desires are about things,” and intentionality is thus “[t]he directedness or ‘aboutness’ of many, if not all, conscious states.”12 As
John R. Searle defines the term, “Intentionality is that property
of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or
about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.”13 Intentionality also includes “the property of mental phenomena whereby
the mind can contemplate non-existent objects and states of affairs.”14 Thus, “I will have your lease ready tomorrow” is inten10. For example, Clarke tells us that “[a] sign is any object of interpretation, a thing
or event that has significance for some interpreter. It can stand for some object for this
interpreter, signify an action to be performed, arouse in the interpreter a feeling or emotion, or combine two or more of these functions.” D.S. CLARKE, JR., SOURCES OF SEMIOTIC:
READING WITH COMMENTARY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 1 (1990). Peirce speaks
more carefully in the following passage: “A sign, or representamen [i.e., signifier], is something which stands to somebody for something in some . . . capacity.” 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra
note 7, at 2.228. However, elsewhere, he is not so careful. See id. at 2.230. Peirce notes
that “in order that anything should be a Sign, it must ‘represent,’ as we say, something
else, called its Object . . . .” Id.
11. See also NÖTH, supra note 8, at 79 (also discussing such confusion in the literature).
12. See Intentionality, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (3d ed. 2016).
13. JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 1 (1983).
14. Intentionality, PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (2d ed. 2005).
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tional to the extent it signifies a lease (presently existing or not)
that will be ready tomorrow.
In addition to intentional states such as “[b]eliefs, fears, hopes,
and desires” that are intentional in themselves (since they are
mental states directed outward), intentionality can flow derivatively from the mind as well as the intention by which an act is
performed.15 For example, a legal drafting computer program can
include signifiers that signify because someone has constructed
the program with such intention.16 A computer program (such as
a legal software program) can also have intentionality when
someone reads it as signifying something.17 The divergence of
speaker and hearer meaning can be of great importance for lawyers, and I discuss and contrast speaker and reader meaning (as
well as whose meaning should control) in Part VI below.
Whether we focus on speaker or hearer meaning in the case of
text, for example, such meaning cannot, of course, be simply
equated with the ink marks on a page. Without more, such marks
are just that—ink upon a page. Such ink marks take on intentionality when we (as speaker or hearer) use and interpret such
marks to represent or point beyond themselves. Thus, Charles
Sanders Peirce tells us that “[t]he Sign creates something in the
Mind of the Interpreter,”18 and “nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign.”19 Thus, Eco also tells us that a “sign is not
only something which stands for something else; it is also some-

15. See SEARLE, supra note 13, at 27–29 (on derived intentionality).
16. See also Thomas A. Sebeok, The Doctrine of Signs, in FRONTIERS IN SEMIOTICS 35,
36 (John Deely et al. eds., 1986) (“Any source and any destination [of signs] is a living entity or the product of a living entity, such as a computer . . . .”).
17. Again, Peirce tells us that “[a] sign, or representamen [i.e., signifier], is something
which stands to somebody for something in some . . . capacity.” 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7,
at 2.228.
18. 8 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE
8.179 (Arthur W. Burks ed., 1958).
19. 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.308. We can thus use intentionality to parse between signifiers and non-signifiers. For example, an unobserved tree may have a patch of
bark that cracks in the form of “π.” That crack in the bark is not a signifier of mathematical pi (or any other pi) unless some mind uses or perceives that crack in the bark as signifying pi or as otherwise having such mathematical meaning. I have an express purpose in
using “mind” here rather than “person” when referring to such intentionality. Although
beyond the scope of this Article, I am sympathetic with the field of zoosemiotics, which explores animals and semiotics. See Sebeok, supra note 16, at 76 (“[Zoosemiotics] focuses on
messages given off and received by animals, including important components of human
nonverbal communication, but excluding man’s language and his secondary, languagederived semiotic systems, such as sign language or Morse code.”).
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thing that can and must be interpreted.”20 I further address interpretation (including whose interpretation controls in certain
situations) as the Article progresses. I also contrast interpretation and construction in section VI.B.1 below.
C. Definition of Semiotics
Having defined signs, we can now define “semiotics.” Charles
Morris provides a useful definition: “Semiotic[s] has for its goal a
general theory of signs in all their forms and manifestations,
whether in animals or men, whether normal or pathological,
whether linguistic or nonlinguistic, whether personal or social.
Semiotic is thus an interdisciplinary enterprise.”21
Although Morris uses the term “semiotic,” I follow Sebeok and
use the term “semiotics,” which Sebeok notes has “made irreversible inroads over” the term “semiotic” in American English.22
As a general and interdisciplinary theory of signs which covers
how we signify and how we interpret experience, semiotics is thus
a vast enterprise. As Sebeok tells us, “what semiotics is finally all
about is the role of the mind in the creation of the world or of
physical constructs out of a vast and diverse crush of sense impressions.”23 Good lawyers can hardly fail to have a good grasp of
such an enterprise.
II. STRUCTURE AND CONCOMITANTS OF SIGNS IN MORE DETAIL
With the above preliminaries addressed, we can now turn in
more detail to the structure of signs. In what follows, I shall use
Eco’s description of a sign as “a correlation between a signifier
and a signified (or between expression and content) and therefore
as an action between pairs.”24 As such, I shall distinguish and explore the signifier and the signified as correlated in the sign.

20. ECO, supra note 9, at 46.
21. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 1.
22. Thomas A. Sebeok, “Semiotics” and Its Congeners, in 1 LINGUISTIC AND LITERARY
STUDIES 283, 288 (Mohammad Ali Jazayery et al. eds., 1978).
23. Sebeok, supra note 16, at 42.
24. ECO, supra note 9, at 1.
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A. The Signifier
When lawyers think of signifiers, they often think of either
written text (as with the Justice Scalia example above) or spoken
words (as, for example, in a jury instruction). One of the goals of
this Article is to expand lawyers’ views of the vast expanse of possible signifiers beyond text and spoken words. I will give a concrete example of the importance of such expansion in section IV.B
below, where I briefly explore, as an exemplar for lawyers, Marc
Antony’s use of multiple types of signifiers. In performing such
expiration, I hope lawyers will take to heart Langer’s assertion
that “[l]anguage is by no means our only articulate product.”25
When analyzing signifiers, we must remember that they can include such a wide array as a “concrete object,” “an abstract entity,” “an idea or ‘thought,’” a “perceptible [object],” a “physical
event,” or an “imaginable [object].”26 I explore signifier types further in Part III, where I explore the indexical, iconic, and symbolic signifier types that lawyers and others can encounter and use.
B. The Signified
Since the same person, place, thing, or event can have multiple
meanings (my nephew is also my brother’s son), the signified can
involve both sense (the cognitive or mental component of meaning) and reference (that to which the term refers as fact—such as
the earth revolving around the sun—or fiction, such as Pegasus
flying around the earth).27 Meaning has a sense component to account for the different meanings the same person, place, or thing
may have. Meaning has a reference component to tie meaning to
the specific portions of the objective or fictional world of experience and to tie together the different senses those specific portions may have.28 Thus, for example, reference ties “my nephew”
and “my brother’s son” into the same person. Careful lawyers will
25. Susanne K. Langer, Discursive and Presentational Forms, in SEMIOTICS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANTHOLOGY 87, 96 (Robert E. Innis ed., 1985).
26. See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 80; see also 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.230 (failing
to parse between “sign” and “signifier” in discussing the “perceptible” and the “imaginable”).
27. See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 92–100. The signified may involve only reference when,
for example, it refers to the pre-semantic which has not yet been put to words or otherwise
given sense. See Harold A. Lloyd, Making Good Sense: Pragmatism’s Mastery of Meaning,
Truth, and Workable Rule of Law, 9 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 199, 208–09 (2019).
28. See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 92–100.

LLOYD 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

868

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

4/22/2021 8:57 AM

[Vol. 55:861

grasp both suitable referential aspects of meaning in play as well
as suitable sense.
1. Reference and the Referent
a. Definition of Referent
The referent is that to which a signifier refers as fact or fiction.29 Again, for example, it is the single person referred to by
both “my nephew” and “my brother’s son.”
Lawyers should remember that when we meaningfully refer
with our signifiers, we are referring within the context of experience as we have interpreted it in our webs of signs (unless we
would refer, without more, to the yet-to-be interpreted).30 When
referring within such interpreted experience, we are thus not referring to unknown or transcendentally fixed things-inthemselves. Instead, we are referring to “things” within our semantic lifeworlds31 woven out of our webs of signs. Since we
weave our webs of signs, such webs of signs and the “things”
within them are not transcendentally given and we can thus revise our referents to the extent pre-semantic and semantic restraints allow.32
Lawyers should remember this critical nature of reference because it permits progress. Since reference (other than reference
without more to the yet-to-be interpreted) occurs within our semiotics and is thus not transcendentally given, and since any reality to which we refer is thus “internal” to our semantic lifeworlds,33 we can always have hope of changing reference where
progress requires. Thus, for example, since the referent of marriage is not transcendentally fixed, we can point out its referent
with definite descriptions34 that do not limit the referent to heter-

29. See Reference, PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 14.
30. Lloyd, supra note 27, at 208–09.
31. See infra Appendix for a brief outline of the term “lifeworld” and related terms.
32. See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 206–10, 222–44, 264–74, where I discuss in detail the
freedoms and restraints on change.
33. See id.; see also HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE 114 (James Conant ed., 1992) (the internal realist “is willing to think of reference as internal to ‘texts’ (or
theories), provided we recognize that there are better and worse ‘texts.’ ‘Better’ and ‘worse’
may themselves depend on our historical situation and our purposes; there is no notion of
a God’s-Eye View of Truth here . . . .”).
34. The referent of marriage here is an institution whose sense has unfolded in expe-
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osexual unions (much like we can point out the referent of earth
with definite descriptions that do not involve older descriptions
such as the flat surface at the center of the universe).35 As I have
written elsewhere, re-describing commonly accepted aspects of
lifeworlds can face considerable pushback, but lawyers have a duty to resist such pushback where moral or other experience (or
both) require.36 The same duty applies to the “sense” component
of meaning discussed in more detail below.
b. Reference Difficulties for Lawyers and Others
Forgetting that references are not transcendentally fixed is
thus a first-order error of reference. Where references in our semantic lifeworld are wrong or wrongly determined by definite descriptions as in the case of marriage or earth as discussed above,
forgetting that such error is at most “mind-forged manacles”37
that we might break is a tragedy of the highest order for lawyers
and their clients.
A second-order error of reference stems from the act of referring itself. When a client, for example, would refer to something
whose ownership she disputes with her sibling (such as a diamond money clip to which she points), problems can arise from
the mechanics of reference itself. From the outset, lawyers should
know that mere pointing alone never works as a clear indication
of reference. For how can pointing in itself determine the multiple
possible referents to which we point in any case? For example, if
we point at a person, are we pointing at the whole person, the
rience as discussed in this Article. By “definite descriptions,” I mean a “description of a
(putative) object as the single, unique, bearer of a property: ‘the smallest positive number’;
‘the first dog born at sea’; ‘the richest person in the world.’” Definite Description, OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 12.
35. Philosophers do not agree on how reference works. See Referring, THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005) (“Intuitively, for an expression to refer is for it to stand for or pick out something, but what this involves has been
long debated. According to Frege the reference of an expression is determined by its sense,
but lately Kaplan and Kripke have argued that some terms such as demonstratives, proper names, and natural-kind terms, refer directly.”). Lawyers do not have the luxury of debate here and must make reference work in their discussions with clients and others.
Proper names where applicable “like ‘Julius Caesar’ or definite descriptions like ‘the conqueror of Gaul’” seem to me sounder ways to start. See Reference, PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 14.
36. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 27, at 264–74 (discussing “workability” to avoid presemantic and semantic pushback).
37. See WILLIAM BLAKE, London, in SONGS OF INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE WITH
OTHER POEMS 65, 65 (Basil Montagu Pickering 1866).
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person’s head, the person as a person of a certain type, the place
where person is standing, the direction in which the person
stands, and so on? As Wittgenstein thus notes, when one wishes
to name a person by pointing at the person, the viewer might instead take that act as pointing to “. . . a colour, . . . a race, or even
of a point of the compass.”38
In the hypothetical above, perhaps the client is only pointing to
one of the diamonds in the money clip rather than to the money
clip itself. Perhaps the sibling does not care about that diamond
and would be satisfied with the rest of the money clip. The lawyer
would be well-advised here to inquire in more depth as to the client’s reference; otherwise, the parties may have an unnecessary
lawsuit.
Reference can also be further complicated here by imprecision
on the client’s part. The client may actually speak of the entire
money clip though she only really wants the diamond. Her lawyer
must thus not only seek precision as to her expressed reference
but also seek clarity as to her real reference. As I have discussed
the need for careful reference in detail elsewhere,39 I will not discuss the matter further here.
2. Sense
a. Overview
With the understanding that “experience” includes external
experience (i.e., public or objective experience) as well as internal
experience (i.e., private40 experience such as thoughts, imagination, memories, and feelings41), in defining “sense” I shall use the
following modified version of Charles Sanders Peirce’s early
pragmatic notion of meaning: the sense of a particular concept is
the total actual and possibly conceivable42 ways in which that
38. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 13–14 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 2d ed. 1958).
39. See Harold A. Lloyd, Plane Meaning and Thought: Real-World Semantics and Fictions of Originalism, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 657, 680–83 (2015).
40. By private experience, I mean experience private to the individual such as (without limitation) a thought or pleasant or painful sensation.
41. This is thus broader than “synthesis, imagination, memory, evaluation and estimation” which Deely calls the “internal sense in philosophical tradition.” JOHN DEELY,
INTRODUCING SEMIOTIC: ITS HISTORY AND DOCTRINE 98 (1982).
42. Again, this can include private experience. “Possible” incorporates a normative as
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concept unfolds or can unfold in such experience.43 Thus, for example, the different senses of “President of the Senate” and “Vice
President” (both of which refer to the same person) depend upon
the different ways such notions play out in such experience.44
I choose this approach to sense for at least two reasons. First, if
sense does not come through either external experience (i.e., public or objective experience) or through internal experience (i.e.,
private experience such as thoughts, imagination, memories, and
feelings), how could we possibly know it or relate it to the world of
our external or internal experience? Second, and consistent with
the first reason, this notion of sense fits how we understand sense
in court, in the practice of law, in law school, and in life. If one
asks good lawyers, for example, what an actual or proposed liability limitation in a contract means, such lawyers would “flesh it
out” and would describe how the liability limitation would play
out in practice. These reasons are compelling in themselves, and I
will therefore not explore in this Article difficulties with other
current accounts of meaning and sense that I have discussed
elsewhere (such as meaning as reference alone, meaning as merely ideas, behaviorism, and meaning as truth conditions).45 Conwell as factual sense. For example, it is not possible in common speech for a typical dog to
have ten legs.
43. Peirce’s formula reads: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of
these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” 5 & 6 PEIRCE, supra note 6, at
5.402. To the extent Peirce’s formula focuses only on objective experience and therefore
results in beliefs being synonymous if they cause the same habits, I would disagree. See
JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM: FROM PEIRCE TO DAVIDSON 25–26 (1990). For example,
after hearing a knock, I could have a habit of walking across my office to the door in just
the same way whether I believe that a student or another professor is at the door. See also
WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 18 (Thomas Crofts & Philip Smith eds., Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1995) (1907) (setting out James’s interpretation of Peirce’s notion of meaning).
44. Such experience can include connotation, or the “socio-cultural and personal associations,” attached to the signifier or the signified. See DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE
BASICS 246 (2d ed. 2007).
45. See Harold A. Lloyd, Exercising Common Sense, Exorcising Langdell: The Inseparability of Legal Theory, Practice and the Humanities, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1213,
1250–54 (2014). Additionally, C.K. Ogden & I.A. Richards outline no less than sixteen
broad approaches to meaning (with some approaches having various subdivisions). In this
outline, meaning can be: “I An Intrinsic property. II A unique unanalysable Relation to
other things. III The other words annexed to a word in the Dictionary. IV The Connotation
of a word. V An Essence. VI An activity Projected into an object. VII (a) An event intended.
(b) A Volition. VIII The Place of anything in a system. IX The Practical Consequences of a
thing in our future experience. [This comes closest to my definition, although I would include past experience and am careful to include both external and internal experience as
above defined.] X The Theoretical consequences involved in or implied by a statement. XI
Emotion aroused by anything. XII That which is Actually related to a sign by a chosen re-
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sistent with the experiential definition I have used of “sense,” the
signified may, however, be much less complex than how a proposed liability limitation in a contract might play out in experience. In some cases, the signified might simply be a feeling (or at
least at first just a feeling). Peirce, for example, tells us that
“[t]he first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced
by it. There is almost always a feeling which we come to interpret
as evidence that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight.”46
Signs can also produce a feeling that something is not right.
For example, the word “slave” might invoke to Huckleberry Finn
a certain extreme malaise that he cannot put into words in his
current vocabulary. As I have argued elsewhere, such feeling can
play an important role in our interactions with the world, as with
Huck’s decision to help liberate a slave even though his concepts
and categories of the time told him that was wrong.47 Lawyers,
too, should of course listen to their feelings when, for example, a
proposed text or course of action does not feel right.
The signified can be feelings of other kinds as well. For example, Peirce believes that “the performance of a piece of concerted
music is a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer’s musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of
feelings.”48
Thus, when I refer to “experience,” I refer along with Deely to
“the whole of our experience, from its most primitive origins in
sensation to its most refined achievements of understanding” and
thus to a “network or web of sign relations.”49 I also agree with

lation. XIII (a) The Mnemic effects of a stimulus. Associations required. (b) Some other
occurrence to which the mnemic effects of any occurrence are Appropriate. (c) That which
a sign is Interpreted as being of. (d) What anything Suggests. In the case of Symbols. That
to which the User of a Symbol actually refers. XIV That to which the user of a symbol
Ought to be referring. XV That to which the user of a symbol Believes himself to be referring. XVI That to which the Interpreter of a symbol (a) Refers. (b) Believes himself to be
referring. (c) Believes the User to be referring.” C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE
MEANING OF MEANING 186–87 (1923). If we are to know any such meaning, I would simply
ask how such meaning could be separated from “experience” as I have defined it. Such a
return to experience as I have defined it, of course, returns us to my proposed definitions
of meaning and sense.
46. 5 & 6 PEIRCE, supra note 6, at 5.475.
47. See Harold A. Lloyd, Cognitive Emotion and the Law, 41 L. & PSYCH. REV. 53, 62–
63 (2016); Lloyd, supra note 27, at 225–26.
48. 5 & 6 PEIRCE, supra note 6, at 5.475.
49. JOHN DEELY, BASICS OF SEMIOTICS 13 (1990).

LLOYD 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/22/2021 8:57 AM

SEMIOTICS IN LEGAL THEORY, PRACTICE, AND EDUCATION

873

Deely that “experience reveals itself as a constructed network
built over time both through [our] biological heritage . . . and
through the individual experiences whereby, atop the biological
heritage, socialization and enculturation transpire.”50
Finally, lawyers should remember that sense, like reference, is
not transcendentally fixed.51 We can and should adjust our sense
as moral or other experience (or both) demands. For example,
where moral or other experience (or both) require correction of
the dehumanizing of homosexuals, lawyers should work against
such dehumanization. No matter how old the pedigree of such
dehumanization, such dehumanization is not transcendentally
fixed52 and can therefore be combatted and corrected no less than
notions, again, that once held that the Earth is flat and at the
center of the universe. Once more, however, lawyers must be
aware of the strong pushback that may occur when commonly
held meanings and categorizations are challenged in lifeworlds
and strategize accordingly.53
b. Sense and “Dimensions of Signification”
With Morris, we can also usefully note a further expansive nature of sense, distinguishing between three “dimensions” of signification: the designative, appraisive, and prescriptive.54 Morris
thus tells us that the “designative” involves the “[s]ense organs”
and relates to “[o]btaining information”; the “appraisive” involves
“[o]bject preferences” and relates to the “[s]election of objects for
preferential behavior”; and the “prescriptive” involves “[b]ehavior
preferences” and relates to “[a]ction on object by specific behavior.”55 As examples, he tells us that “usually ‘black’ is primarily
descriptive, ‘good’ is primarily appraisive, and ‘ought’ is primarily
prescriptive.”56 Morris notes that context can change this result,
and in some contexts, “black” can be “primarily appraisive or prescriptive,” “good” can be primarily “designative or prescriptive,”
and “ought” can be “primarily designative or appraisive.”57 Morris
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 14.
See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 210–22.
See id.
See id. at 227–43.
MORRIS, supra note 4, at 4.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
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also notes that any particular sign may in varying degrees operate in all the dimensions of signification.58 Again, therefore, sense
may involve more than just communication of fact or fiction. Rather than simply listening to a client’s words, a lawyer should, of
course, probe the way the client describes and perceives the matter at hand, the way the client appraises the matter at hand, and
the way the client would prefer to act. It is hard to see how a lawyer can discern a client’s real interests in a matter without exploring Morris’s three dimensions of signification. In this regard,
one can consider again the diamond money clip dispute discussed
in section II.B.1.b above.
3. Reference, Sense, and RIRAC: Polishing One Legal Form of
Thought
We can also use the sense and reference dimensions of meaning
to polish a common legal form of thought: IRAC. In teaching law
students to address all necessary steps in legal analysis, we teach
them, among other things, the IRAC form, which stands for “Issue,” “Rule,” “Application,” and “Conclusion.”59 Using IRAC as
both a form and as a checklist, students and lawyers can both
improve the logical flow of their analysis and check for omissions
in their analysis. As to logical flow, resolving legal issues requires
finding the rules that govern such issues, applying such rules,
and reaching a conclusion. As to IRAC as a checklist, it reminds
students and lawyers to identify and explore fully the issue or issues in play, to fully research and explore the rules in play, to fully and expressly apply those rules in play (a step that requires
constant reminder given the tendency to assume readers also
know all the application steps that are in the student’s or lawyer’s head), and to provide the appropriate conclusion in a way
that makes sense to the reader.
IRAC is thus quite useful as far as it goes. However, its focus
on issues, rules, applications, and conclusions is a focus on the
sense aspect of meaning. As we have seen that meaning involves
both reference and sense, IRAC safely works only where there is
no dispute or confusion as to reference. As we saw with the diamond money clip above, assuming no dispute or confusion as to
58.
59.

Id.
CHRISTINE COUGHLIN, JOHN MALMUD ROCKLIN & SANDY PATRICK, A LAWYER
WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS 94 (3d ed. 2018).
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reference can be quite dangerous. I therefore teach students that
they should remember, in actual law practice at least, the more
expansive checklist of RIRAC, with the first “R” standing for “reference.” I, in fact, encourage them to think of RIRAC as one of the
most basic forms (if not the most basic form) of checklists, as it is
applicable across a wide variety of legal situations. For example,
when a client arrives to discuss a dispute (such as a dispute involving the money clip above), the lawyer’s first step should be to
clarify the reference. If the lawyer, client, or opposing party is
confused about the reference, then the issues, rules, applications,
and conclusions debated and explored may be irrelevant to the
real matter in dispute. As shown by the diamond money clip dispute above, finding such reference can be difficult, but it must be
done. Lawyers must have a complete and accurate grasp of the
signified, which includes reference as well as sense. Since I have
also addressed RIRAC in detail elsewhere,60 I will not explore it
further here.
III. CORRELATION OF SIGNIFIER AND SIGNIFIED AND THREE
CLASSIFICATIONS OF SIGNS
Having explored both the signifier and the signified, we can
now explore their correlation. This should help demonstrate to
lawyers the vast expanse of signs available for their use. In what
follows, I shall again use Eco’s description above of a sign as “a
correlation between a signifier and a signified (or between expression and content) and therefore as an action between pairs.”61
Peirce gives us three basic types of correlation (the indexical, the
iconic, and the symbolic62) that are of special interest to lawyers,
and I thus briefly explore below the signifier-signified co-relations
in indices, icons, and symbols.63 Since lawyers tend to focus on
text and speech (which use symbolic forms of signifiers), I will
begin with Peirce’s perhaps less familiar types of signs involving
indexical and iconic signifiers.

60. See Lloyd, supra note 39, at 669–70.
61. ECO, supra note 9, at 1.
62. 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.275; 8 PEIRCE, supra note 18, at 8.335. See also
generally 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.247–49, 2.275–307.
63. I agree with Chandler that “[a]lthough [this tripartite division of signs] is often
referred to as a classification of distinct ‘types of signs,’ it is more usefully interpreted in
terms of differing ‘modes of relationship’ between [signifiers] and what is signified.”
CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 36.
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A. Indices
1. Correlation of “Real” Relation
Peirce tells us that “[a]n Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object,”64 or “by virtue of being in a real relation to it.”65 Chandler
usefully expands upon the indexical relation as “a mode in which
the signifier is not arbitrary but is directly connected in some way
(physically or causally) to the signified (regardless of intention).”66
Peirce gives a number of examples of indices, including the following: a sundial indicating the time; a “rap on the door”; “a tremendous thunderbolt [indicating] that something considerable
happened”; “[a] low barometer with a moist air” indicating rain; a
“weathercock” indicating the direction of the wind; “[t]he pole
star” indicating north like a “pointing finger”; a “plumb bob” indicating the “vertical direction”; demonstrative pronouns like “this”
and “that” indicating when successfully calling “upon the hearer
to use his powers of observation [in order to] establish a real connection between his mind and the object”; and letters such as “A,
B, C, D” used by geometricians to indicate parts of diagrams or
used by lawyers and others to “fulfill the office of relative pronouns.”67 Thus, Peirce also tells us that pronouns are indices because “they indicate things in the directest possible way.”68 Thus,
“[a] pronoun ought to be defined as a word which may indicate
anything to which the first and second persons have suitable real
connections, by calling the attention of the second person to it.”69
Similarly, indices can also be “more or less detailed directions for
what the hearer is to do in order to place himself in direct experiential or other connection with the thing meant.”70 This could include such notices as “there is a rock, or shoal, or buoy, or lightship.”71 Peirce also claims both that proper names are indices72

Id.

64.
65.

1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.248.
See 8 PEIRCE, supra note 18, at 8.335. Peirce uses the term “dynamic object” here.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 37.
1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.285–87.
Id. at 2.287 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 2.288.
Id.
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and that proper names “should probably be regarded as Indices.”73 Short explains Peirce’s likely thinking here as follows:
“[W]e can say that each replica of the same proper name, e.g.,
‘Napoleon Bonaparte’, signifies whatever earlier replicas signified, going back to its original replicas, assigned, by an act of
naming . . . .”74 Finally, Peirce notes the role of indices in successful communication. The claim “Why, it is raining!” does not tell us
where it is raining; we need either context (such as the speaker’s
“standing here looking out at a window as he speaks, which
would serve as an Index”), or we need the proposition itself to indicate where it is raining.75
Noting that the link between signifier and signified “can be observed or inferred,” as examples of indices, he lists:
[N]atural signs (smoke, thunder, footprints, echoes, non-synthetic
odours and flavours), medical symptoms (pain, a rash, pulse-rate),
measuring instruments (weathercock, thermometer, clock, spiritlevel), ‘signals’ (a knock on the door, a phone ringing), pointers (a
pointing ‘index’ finger, a directional signpost), recordings (a photograph, a film, video or television shot, an audio-recorded voice), [and]
personal ‘trademarks’ (handwriting, catchphrases).76

I could, of course, explore in virtually endless detail Peirce’s
other complex comments on indices (some of which I would challenge). However, my purpose here is to explore semiotics in a
form useful to lawyers, and this enumeration of indices should
suffice for the notion that indexical relations occur where “the
signifier is not arbitrary but is directly connected in some way
(physically or causally) to the signified (regardless of intention).”77

72. See 8 PEIRCE, supra note 18, at 8.335.
73. 3 & 4 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS
PEIRCE 4.544 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1980). As an example of the difficulties of parsing out Peirce’s actual thought, he also tells us that “a proper name, personal
demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it
does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it is not
an individual.” 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.284. Again, my purpose here is to provide
an overview of semiotics that I believe works and is useful to lawyers; I am not trying to
provide an encyclopedic survey of conflicting views between various thinkers and within
individual thinkers themselves.
74. T.L. Short, Life Among the Legisigns, in FRONTIERS IN SEMIOTICS, supra note 16,
at 105, 112.
75. See 3 & 4 PEIRCE, supra note 73, at 4.544.
76. CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 37.
77. Id.
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2. Evidence and Indices
Many lawyers will no doubt quickly think of evidence when
they consider such a notion of the indexical sign. A bloody knife,
for example, can be an indexical sign of a stabbing if the knife is
directly connected to that stabbing in the way that indexical corelations require. Rather than a mere academic exercise, understanding the nature and proof of such indexical co-relations is
thus of critical importance to lawyers. An indexical bloody knife
also reminds the lawyer of the potential power of indexicals over
words in such cases. A bloody knife directly connected with both a
stabbing and the person alleged to have committed the stabbing
can be much more rhetorically compelling than the victim’s
words, especially if the stabber disputes the victim’s words. I will
return to indices in Part IV.B, when I explore the rhetorical indexical force of Caesar’s body, bloody toga, and will in Marc Antony’s funeral oration for Caesar, and in Part VIII, when I explore
certain indexical claims in the context of the First Amendment.
B. Icons
1. Correlation of Similarity
Peirce tells us that an icon represents “mainly by its similarity.”78 Chandler usefully clarifies the co-relation of signifier and
signified here as “a mode in which the signifier is perceived as resembling or imitating the signified (recognizably looking, sounding, feeling, tasting or smelling like it) [or] being similar in possessing some of its qualities.”79
For Peirce, icons include, without limitation, images, diagrams,
pictures, and metaphors.80 Peirce also notes that although photographs “are in certain respects exactly like the objects they represent,” they obtain this likeness through the physical connections
of photography. As such, photographs are indices.81 In my view,
photographs are both indices and icons and demonstrate how signifiers and their signified can have multiple co-relations.

78. 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.276.
79. CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 36.
80. 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.277, 2.279.
81. Id. at 2.281.
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Peirce points out that resemblance need not turn on appearance. It can also involve resemblance of objects in terms of “the
relations of their parts.”82 Diagrams, for example, may set out
certain parts of their objects without truly resembling them.83
Lawyers may, at first blush, consider icons less useful than indices, because the latter have “real” relations to what they signify. For example, a clear photograph of an alleged criminal stabbing a victim is certainly more persuasive of guilt than a clear
drawing of the same act. This initial thought, however, underestimates the value of icons in practice. First, icons can focus only
on relevant relations, as in the case of diagrams.84 As such, they
permit us to study and discover new knowledge from depictions of
such relations.85 By excluding irrelevant aspects of matters diagrammed, they can perhaps expedite such discovery. Diagrams
can also perhaps expedite uncovering error or other difficulties in
the matters diagrammed. Second, since icons are untethered from
the “real” relations found in photography, they allow rhetorical
use not possible with indices such as photographs.86 Cartoons, for
example, can powerfully depict points of views by the manner in
which they portray the persons, places, things, or other matters.
Lawyers should also remember that the iconic signification can
be all the more powerful or memorable by focusing on unexpected
points of resemblance. For example, Oscar Wilde famously refers
to a person with a “shrill horrid voice” as “a peacock in everything
but beauty.”87
In addition to their imitative aspects, icons interrelate with the
non-imitative in ways that lawyers should also understand if they
are to effectively use and respond to iconic signifiers.

82. Id. at 2.282.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 2.279.
86. One can, of course, untether photographs by “touching them up” or by otherwise
altering them. However, to the extent this breaks the “real” relation with the matters depicted, the photographs by definition no longer remain indexical. They would, of course,
remain iconic to the extent of any resemblance to the signified.
87. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 190 (Michael Patrick Gillespie ed.,
2007) (1890). Jakobson gives us another striking example: “A missionary blamed his African flock for walking [around] undressed. ‘And what about yourself?’ they pointed to his
visage, ‘are not you, too, somewhere naked?’ ‘Well, but that is my face.’ ‘Yet in us,’ retorted
the natives, ‘everywhere it is face.’” Roman Jakobson, Closing Statement: Linguistics and
Poetics, in SEMIOTICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANTHOLOGY, supra note 25, at 145, 173.
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2. Functions of Background
As Schapiro points out, icons such as images or paintings generally appear against the background, a background which we often assume today to be rectangular and having a “clearly defined
smooth surface on which one draws and writes.”88 Of course, such
a background is not compelled, and lawyers seeking the most effective form of, for example, iconic exhibits should consider
whether other background shapes and textures would be preferable in the lawyers’ specific situation.89 We can go even further and
ask whether we want a clear distinction between background and
image. In this regard, Schapiro reminds us that “prehistoric wall
paintings and reliefs . . . had to compete with the noise-like accidents and irregularities of a ground which was no less articulated
than the sign and could intrude upon it.”90
3. Functions of Physical Frames
As Schapiro also points out, iconic images may or may not have
physical frames.91 Leaving the image unframed may make it appear “more completely and modestly the artist’s work.”92 Depending on the choice of frame, the frame can help accent the iconic
image, can serve as a “finding and focusing device,” and can act
“like a window frame through which is seen a space behind the
glass” where the world of the iconic image lies.93

88. Meyer Schapiro, On Some Problems in the Semiotics of the Visual Arts: Field and
Vehicle in Image-Signs, in SEMIOTICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANTHOLOGY, supra note 25, at
206, 209.
89. Thus, Schapiro tells us of those who “have painted on pebbles and on found fragments of natural and artificial objects, exploiting the irregularities of the ground and in
the physiognomy of the object as part of the charm of the whole.” Id. at 211. Schapiro also
reminds us that ancient cave paintings were on “the rough wall of a cave” where “the irregularities of earth and rock show through the image,” and the painter worked “on a field
with no set boundaries and thought so little of the surface as a distinct ground that he often painted his animal figure over a previously painted image without erasing the latter,
as if it were invisible to the viewer.” Id. at 209.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 212–13.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 212.
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4. Functions of Size
Additionally, size plays a role in how we perceive the iconic image. Our reaction may change as a function of “the size of the
field and the size of different components of the image relative to
real objects which they signify and relative to each other.”94 For
example, one might paint Alexander the Great as larger than his
soldiers to reflect the notion of “Alexander as the Great.”95
5. Functions of Place
Where we have a bounded visual field, iconic images can
change in quality depending upon their location within various
parts of the field, such as “upper and lower, left and right, central
and peripheral, the corners and the rest of the space.”96 For example, a figure off-center can appear “anomalous, displaced, even
spiritually strained.”97 All of these non-imitative aspects of iconic
images can thus play important roles in lawyers’ use of, and response to, iconic signifiers.
6. Icons, Art, and Knowledge
In any case, the semiotic possibilities of the icon discussed
above should persuade lawyers of the value and importance of
icons. Hopefully this includes lawyers who previously may have
dismissed icons’ importance because of a more general belief that
art is merely “some alien universe into which we are magically
transported for a time.”98 Because icons signify, we lawyers, too,
can say that art can be “knowledge,” and in such a case, “experiencing an artwork means sharing in that knowledge.”99 I will return to icons in Part IV below, when I discuss the power of mixing
icons, indices, and symbols.

94. Id. at 219.
95. Id. at 221.
96. Id. at 214.
97. Id.
98. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD 83 (Joel Weinsheimar & Donald G.
Marshall trans., rev. ed. 2004).
99. Id. at 84.
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C. Symbols
1. Correlation of Convention or Stipulation
Taking inspiration again from Peirce, symbols are signs whose
signifier and signified are correlated solely100 by convention or by
habit,101 or otherwise “by the fact that [they are] used and understood as such.”102 Symbols would thus include “words, sentences,
books, and other conventional signs.”103 Chandler again usefully
expands upon Peirce by noting that the symbolic mode is “a mode
in which the signifier does not resemble the signified but which is
fundamentally arbitrary or purely conventional – so that this relationship must be agreed upon and learned.”104 Chandler would
thus expand upon the above list of symbols to include, for example, “language in general (plus specific languages, alphabetical
letters, punctuation marks, words, phrases and sentences), numbers, morse [sic] code, traffic lights, [and] national flags.”105
2. Symbolic Signifiers: Freedom yet Restraint
Any “concrete object,” “abstract entity,” “idea or ‘thought,’”
“perceptible [object],” “physical event,” or “imaginable [object]”106
might serve as a symbolic signifier either by convention or by
stipulation.107 If it is convenient, for example, for parties in a debate to use a white stone to refer to one proposition and a gray
stone to refer to another, there is no semiotic reason why the parties cannot so stipulate. This potential flexibility thus presents
lawyers with vast potential options.

100. See 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.299 (“The symbol is connected with its object
by virtue of the idea of the symbol-using mind, without which no such connection would
exist.”).
101. See id. at 2.292, 2.297.
102. See id. at 2.307.
103. Id. at 2.292.
104. CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 36.
105. Id.
106. See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 80; see also 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.230 (failing
to parse between “sign” and “signifier” in discussing the “perceptible” and the “imaginable”).
107. To the extent any such symbols indicate a speaker’s meaning by being in a causal
or other real connection with such meaning, we could also speak of such symbols of indices
of such meaning. See supra section III.A on indices.
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That said, however, such theoretical freedom can face much real-world pushback. Unconventional signifier usage, for example,
that violates linguistic community norms or that otherwise fails
to move audiences in ways desired will, on its face, fall flat. Lawyers must remember that their surrounding linguistic communities require justification when signifier usage deviates from
norms.108
Such potential flexibility of symbolic signifiers can also raise
other potential legal issues. For example, since any “concrete object,” “abstract entity,” “idea or ‘thought,’” “perceptible” object,
“physical event,” or “imaginable” object109 can potentially serve as
a symbolic signifier, can everything potentially become protected
speech or expression under the First Amendment to the extent
one claims signifier usage in such a case? Obviously, there must
be limits here (for example, no reasonable person would find the
First Amendment protects tossing live grenades as signifiers of
political dissatisfaction), and I briefly touch on semiotics and the
First Amendment in Part VIII.
D. Correlation and the Transubstantiation Fallacy
When exploring the correlation of signifier and signified, lawyers must take care themselves (as well as help their clients to
take such care where appropriate) not to confuse a signifier with
its signified. Such confusion, which one might call the “transubstantiation fallacy,” can cause much unnecessary confusion and
angst.
For example, the flag for many signifies one’s country. However, the flag itself, of course, is not one’s country. Thus, trampling
the flag is not trampling one’s country or otherwise physically
harming one’s country (though such action may signify extreme
disrespect for one’s country). When addressing such impassioned
subjects110 as protests involving damage to national flags, rational discourse thus focuses on flags as signifiers rather than as nations transubstantiated. Similarly, burning a picture of a beloved
108. See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 227–28.
109. See NÖTH, supra note 8, at 80; see also 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.230.
110. Transubstantiation beliefs seem especially likely to occur when dealing with signifieds of high regard. Thus, for example, we have the transubstantiation debate regarding
Christian Communion. See Michael Newsom, Pan-Protestantism and Proselytizing: Minority Religions in a Protestant Empire, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 12–33 (2009).
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person to send a message about that person is not equivalent to
burning that person, and, again, rational discourse should focus
on burning photos as signifiers rather than as persons transubstantiated. In a different manifestation of the transubstantiation
fallacy, using icons as signifiers of divine or religious figures is
not idolatry in the sense of equating such iconic signifiers with
the divine or religious figures signified. Had Cromwell, for example, grasped the transubstantiation fallacy, perhaps much treasured British iconography would have escaped his destruction.111
In any case, awareness of the transubstantiation fallacy should
expose the confused “anti-idolatrous” iconoclast “who destroys religious images”112 used as icons to signify what they resemble.
E. Beyond Correlation: Other Classification Possibilities
Having now finished an overview of sign classifications based
upon three possible correlations of the signifier to the signified
(the indexical, iconic, and symbolic), I briefly note (without exhaustive classification) that we can classify signs in other ways.
For example, we can classify signs based on the qualities of their
signifiers.113 Using a contemporary definition of quality as “an inherent feature: PROPERTY” which includes “an effect that an object has on another object or on the senses,”114 we can thus distinguish and choose signifiers on this basis as well. Hence, a lawyer
might consider whether a red or some other color font used in a
juror exhibit might more powerfully convey certain information
than a traditional black font. She might consider whether a color
photograph serves better than a black-and-white photograph (or
vice versa). In fact, qualities of either sort of photograph may
miss useful qualities that could be found in a sound recording. If
so, is it better to supplement the photographs with sound? Or
might it be better to synchronously fuse certain qualities of sight
and sound by using a film juxtaposing such qualities? Qualities of
signifiers can thus play critical roles whether such signifiers are

111. ANTONIA FRASER, CROMWELL: THE LORD PROTECTOR 102–04 (1973).
112. See Iconoclast, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1983).
113. See, e.g., 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.243–2.244, 2.254. Using further distinctions, Peirce surveys ten classes, see id. at 2.264 (diagramming such ten classes), which he
further expands. See 8 PEIRCE, supra note 18, at 8.343–76.
114. See Quality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 112;
Property, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 112; see also 1 &
2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.244, 2.374–77.
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indexical, iconic, or symbolic.115 Lawyers can also classify and
consider signs by the types of their signifieds including such familiar signifieds to lawyers as terms, propositions, and arguments.116 Although lawyers are often first disposed to focusing on
terms, propositions, and arguments in themselves, they can benefit by considering whether other approaches might be more effective, such as using terms propositions, and arguments in narrative or dialogue.117
IV. INDICES, ICONS, SYMBOLS, AND EXPANSIVE LEGAL RHETORIC
A. Lawyers and the Semiotics of Rhetoric: More than Just Words
As the above discussion of the various types of signs, signifiers,
and the signified should now make clear, legal rhetoric should
hardly be confined to words alone, and a lawyer’s toolbox containing only words is much impoverished. Words are only one type of
symbol, and one may also use other types of symbols not only to
enrich one’s meaning, but to capture meaning that words alone
might not capture. For example, the phrase “love of country”
might be bolstered by the display of that country’s flag. Additionally, as we have seen, symbols do not exhaust the types of signs
available to lawyers and others. Lawyers and others can also enrich and even expand their meaning by use of icons and indices as
well. Facility with all types of signs thus not only enriches expression but allows expression of meaning that might escape use
of words alone. Thus, again, words are a critical part of a lawyer’s
toolbox but so are the other types of signs. In the next section, I
turn to a bit of Shakespeare to underscore the importance of an
expansive semiotics.

115. Again, I rely on the contemporary definition of “quality” noted in the text. Those
interested in Peirce should note his claim that “[s]ince a quality is whatever it is positively
in itself, a quality can only denote an object by virtue of some common ingredient or similarity” and thus works iconically. See 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.254.
116. See id. at 2.261–2.263.
117. For example, Peirce notes that “our own thinking is carried on as a dialogue”
which of course is “subject to almost every imperfection of language.” 5 & 6 PEIRCE, supra
note 6, at 5.506.
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B. Lawyers and the Semiotics of Rhetoric: Antony’s Funeral
Oration
Once lawyers have a good grasp of how signs work and how
signs may be classified by correlations of the signifier and the
signified (in addition to other methods of classification noted in
section III.E), lawyers can find much semiotic instruction in
Shakespeare’s rendition of Antony’s funeral oration for Caesar.118
They can see quite well how words alone ignore much of the semiotic arsenal available to them. Though Antony’s entire speech
bears reading again and again, space limitations require that I
touch on select passages in the sequence in which they appear in
Shakespeare. Had I more space, I would also explore other classics of expansive semiotics such as (1) the illustrated writings of
William Blake, which demonstrate an unparalleled blending of
the iconic and the nonverbal symbolic with the verbal symbolic;
and (2) Barthes’s exploration of the power of intermingling icons,
symbols, colors, placement against the background field, and
more in his examination of a Panzani advertisement.119 I would
suggest a careful review of Blake’s illustrated works and
Barthes’s article for lawyers seeking to improve their rhetoric by
grasping the power of a semiotics beyond words alone.
Although we have only the words from the oration, as we will
see, the words make plain that the oration turns on much more
than mere words. For example, we can begin our selections with
the following lines that powerfully rely on icons and indices as
well as words:
“My heart is in the coffin there with Caesar,
And I must pause til it come back to me.”120
Here Antony indexically points to Caesar’s body which is both
an index of his murder (being physically connected to his murder)
and an icon of Caesar (by virtue of resemblance). The metaphor of
118. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2,
lines 114–15 (Albert Harris Tolman ed., World Book Co. 1913) (1599). In addition to the
selections examined here, I have examined more of Antony’s speech elsewhere. See generally Harold A. Lloyd, Let’s Skill All the Lawyers: Shakespearean Lessons in Law and Rhetoric, 6 ACTA IURIDICA OLOMUCENSIA 9, 49–55 (2011).
119. See Roland Barthes, Rhetoric of the Image, in SEMIOTICS: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 25, at 190, 192–205; THE WILLIAM BLAKE ARCHIVE, http://www.bl
akearchive.org/ [https://perma.cc/QV7H-3WAT]. I hope to do a separate article on William
Blake’s lessons for lawyers including Blake’s semiotic insights.
120. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 118, at act 3, sc. 2, lines 105–06.
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Antony’s heart briefly sharing Caesar’s coffin also helps paint a
powerful picture, a powerful icon of grief.
As with use of Caesar’s body as a signifier above, Antony continues demonstrating adeptness at using the same signifiers for
multiple functions. He invokes Caesar’s will as both an index and
symbol of Caesar’s love of the Roman people. It is an index to the
extent it is directly related to and flowing from Caesar’s affection.
It is a symbol to the extent it stands for Caesar’s love. Antony also mixes in other signifiers: the “sacred blood” as index of the
crime and both index and symbol of the “sacred” man, and hair as
both index and symbol of the man. Thus, Antony speaks in a suspense-building way by calling attention to the will and first feigning not to read it:
But here’s a parchment with the seal of Caesar;
I found it in his closet; ‘tis his will:
Let but the commons hear this testament—
Which, pardon me, I do not mean to read—
And they would go and kiss dead Caesar’s wounds,
And dip their napkins in his sacred blood,
Yea, beg a hair of him for memory . . . .121
Antony also knows the power of centering icons in the field of
vision. To accomplish this with the corpse’s iconic power of resemblance to the once living man, Antony thus continues:
You will compel me, then, to read the will?
Then make a ring about the corpse of Caesar,
And let me show you him that made the will.
Shall I descend? and will you give me leave?122
With the remnants of Caesar and his bloody clothes centered
and in closer focus, Antony continues mixing his various signs as
he examines the body and bloody clothes:
Look, in this place ran Cassius’ dagger through:
See what a rent the envious Casca made:
Through this the well-beloved Brutus stabb’d;
And as he pluck’d his cursed steel away,
Mark how the blood of Caesar follow’d it,
As rushing out of doors, to be resolv’d

121.
122.

Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 127–33.
Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 155–58; see supra section III.B.5 on icons and place.
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If Brutus so unkindly knock’d or no:
For Brutus, as you know, was Caesar’s angel:
Judge, O you gods, how dearly Caesar lov’d him!
This was the most unkindest cut of all . . . .123
In addition to pointing out the indexical evidence of specific
conspirators having participated in the crime, Antony here also
uses the icon of metaphor when he speaks of blood that “followed”
the stabs of Brutus to determine whether Brutus had in fact “so
unkindly knock’d.”
Noting that Caesar fell “at the base of Pompey’s statue,”124 Antony continues:
O, what a fall was there, my countrymen!
Then I, and you, and all of us fell down,
Whilst bloody treason flourish’d over us.
O, now you weep, and I perceive you feel
The dint of pity: these are gracious drops.
Kind souls, what! weep you when you but behold
Our Caesar’s vesture wounded? Look you here,
Here is himself, marr’d, as you see, with traitors.125
Here with Caesar’s fall, Antony uses an event as a signifier
that he extends metaphorically (and thus iconically) to the resulting fall of Antony and the crowd (“all of us fell down”). And, of
course, once again Antony points to Caesar’s “marr’d” body as indicating murder.
Powerfully showing further that indices can be compounded as
iconic metaphors, Antony continues:
I tell you that which you yourselves do know;
Show you sweet Caesar’s wounds, poor, poor dumb mouths,126
And bid them speak for me: but, were I Brutus,
And Brutus Antony, there were an Antony
Would ruffle up your spirits, and put a tongue
In every wound of Caesar that should move
The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny.127
123. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 118, at act 3, sc. 2, lines 172–81.
124. Id. at act 3, sc. 2, line 186.
125. Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 188–95.
126. Antony turns this powerful metaphor into allegory by repeated use in what follows. See RICHARD A. LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORICAL TERMS 4–6 (2d ed. 1991).
127. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 118, act 3, sc. 2, lines 221–27.
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The wounds again serve here as indices of the murder, but now
they are also iconically “poor dumb mouths” waiting for their
tongues to call out mutiny. This extraordinary metaphor shows
that Antony (like good lawyers) fully appreciates the power of image over argument in appropriate circumstances.
Antony returns to the will to make multiple indexical points.
The now-disclosed contents of the will indicate Caesar’s goodness
and love for the Roman people. “Caesar’s seal” indicates the authenticity of the will. Thus, Antony continues:
Here is the will, and under Caesar’s seal:
To every Roman citizen he gives,
To every several man, seventy-five drachmas. . . .
Moreover, he hath left you all his walks,
His private arbors, and new-planted orchards,
On this side Tiber. He hath left them you,
And to your heirs forever—common pleasures
To walk abroad and recreate yourselves.
Here was a Caesar. When comes such another?128
When he realizes that his mixture of symbols, indices, and
icons has proven powerfully effective, Antony remarks:
Now let it work. Mischief, thou art afoot;
Take thou what course thou wilt.129
Hopefully the selective remarks above demonstrate why lawyers should ponder the entire speech and its semiotics. Hopefully
such selective remarks also demonstrate how lawyers who rely
primarily on words rely on a much-impoverished semiotics.
V. SEMIOTICS AND SPEECH ACTS OF INTEREST TO LAWYERS
Having seen how Antony orchestrates a panoply of sense with
different types of signs and different types of expression, we can
now note in more detail how lawyers encounter multiple types of
speech acts (i.e., acts performed with signs)130 in their practice.
128. Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 254–56, 261–66.
129. Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 275–76.
130. My semiotic definition is broader than definitions focusing only on words. See, e.g.,
Speech Acts, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 12 (defining speech acts as
“acts performed when words are uttered”). In discussing speech acts, J.L. Austin used the
following distinctions: (1) Locutionary acts consist of “the phonetic act, of making noises,
the phatic act of making a grammatical sentence, and the rhetic act of saying something
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Although I shall use the term “speech act” because of its wide usage, “semiotic act” would be more accurate and useful since words
are only one type of signs, and I would encourage such change of
terminology.
A. Assertives, Directives, Commissives, Expressives, Declaratives,
Verdictives
Although I do not claim that these are the only or definitive
categories of speech acts, Alan Cruse lists several categories
which are useful for the purposes of this Article.131
“Assertives” are speech acts that “commit the speaker to the
truth of the expressed proposition,” such as speech acts which
“state, suggest, boast” or “claim” or “report.”132 Stating “X has
been banned for ninety days,” is thus an example of an assertive
speech act. “Directives” are speech acts having “the intention of
eliciting some sort of action on the part of the hearer,” such as
giving an “order” or “command.”133 An order of a public official
that commands the banning of X for ninety days would be an example of such a directive speech act by directing, for example, a
group of persons not to use X. “Commissives” are speech acts that
“commit the speaker to some future action” such as promising, offering, contracting, or threatening.134 “Expressives” are speech
acts which “make known the speaker’s psychological attitude to a
presupposed state of affairs,” such as praising, blaming, thanking, and congratulating.135 Blaming X for causing certain ills
would be an example of such an expressive speech act. “Declaratives” are speech acts which “bring about a change in reality”
which is “over and above the fact that they have been carried
out.”136 For example, the declaratives “I hereby resign as Presimeaningful.” Id. (2) Illocutionary acts are “what is done in saying something, such as
threatening or praying or promising.” Id. (3) Perlocutionary acts are the “effects on hearers, such as frightening them.” Id.
131. ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS AND
PRAGMATICS 374–75 (2d ed. 2004). For other earlier and “classic” overviews of speech acts,
see generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà
eds., 2d ed. 1975); SEARLE, supra note 13, at 166.
132. CRUSE, supra note 131, at 374.
133. Id. at 374–75.
134. Id. at 375.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see also SEARLE, supra note 13, at 166 (recognizing “declarations, where we
bring about changes in the world with our utterances”).
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dent” or “I hereby open this exhibition” make actual changes in
the social fabric of the world beyond just adding those uttered
phrases to the set of phrases uttered in this world.137 Such declaratives change who is President (in the former) and open up an
exhibition (in the latter). Thus, in the case of resignation, the declarant would “no longer hold the post [the declarant] originally
held, with all that entails.”138 Additionally, J.L. Austin speaks of
a group of speech acts called “verdictives” that are such “judicial
acts” as convicting, acquitting, and fact finding.139
B. Other Possible Speech Act Distinctions
For purposes of this Article, I draw from the speech act categories set forth above, although I acknowledge reasonable minds
can differ as to how to draw performative categories (just as reasonable minds can differ about many other categories that we
draw). One might argue, for example, that verdictives are in fact
blends of assertives to the extent that they assert fault, directives
to the extent that they direct a defendant to pay money, expressives to the extent that they blame a defendant, and declaratives
to the extent that they change someone’s legal status through
sentencing. However, speaking of the “verdictive” is useful and
timesaving for the brief jury exploration I do below in Part VI.
Such categories are also otherwise useful in the discussion of
sense and meaning more broadly signified by various types of
signs.
VI. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF SPEECH ACTS
AND SIGNS
Lawyers, of course, can be faced with all such types of speech or
semiotic acts. In doing so, they can face such questions as who
should count as the speaker/writer, who should count as the
hearer/reader, and whose meaning should control. I therefore explore these fundamental semiotic issues.

137. See CRUSE, supra note 131, at 375.
138. Id. at 343.
139. AUSTIN, supra note 131, at 153.
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A. Utterer/Speaker/Author Versus Hearer/Reader Meaning
Starting first with whose meaning should control, we must remember that to have meaning, we must have interpretation.
Again, Charles Sanders Peirce tells us that “nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign,”140 and Eco tells us that a “sign is
not only something which stands for something else; it is also
something that can and must be interpreted.”141
Of course, utterer/speaker/author and hearer/reader meaning
can differ, and this leads us to the question of whose (if anyone’s)
meaning should prevail. As a fascinating example of such difference, Robert Benson tells us that the author’s meaning for The
Wizard of Oz is very different from the way most readers understand the work today.142 According to Benson, rather than a fairy
tale of good and evil involving a girl coming of age, the author
meant the work to be a populist, political allegory.143
An abbreviated list of the author’s meanings claimed by Benson include: Dorothy as representing the average person, the Yellow Brick Road as representing the gold standard, Dorothy’s silver (as opposed to the film’s red) slippers as representing free
silver money, Oz as an abbreviation of “ounce” (used to measure
gold and silver), the Wicked Witch of the East as representing
capitalists and bankers, the Tin Man as representing the factory
worker, the Scarecrow as representing the farmer, the Munchkins as representing the “little people,” the Cowardly Lion as representing William Jennings Bryan, and the Wizard as representing the President who governs the realm by his sleight of hand.144
The typical modern reader, having little or no awareness of such
allegory from another time, of course, will read the work quite differently.
The law is aware that utterer/speaker/author meaning can differ from hearer/reader meaning. Thus, the Supreme Court has
noted, in Spence v. Washington, that “[a] person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man’s comfort

140. 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.306.
141. ECO, supra note 9, at 46.
142. ROBERT BENSON, THE INTERPRETATION GAME: HOW JUDGES AND LAWYERS MAKE
THE LAW 52–53 (2008).
143. Id. at 52.
144. Id.
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and inspiration is another’s jest and scorn.”145 That said, however,
we still have the question of whose (if anyone’s) meaning should
prevail when meanings conflict.
B. Whose Meaning Controls: Some Initial Definitions and
Distinctions
Focusing on determining whether utterer/speaker/author or
hearer/reader meaning should control in several types of nonfiction146 speech acts of particular interest to lawyers, I must next
explore some critical distinctions that come into play in determining such operative meaning.
1. Interpretation Versus Construction
First, we should note the critical distinction between interpretation and construction. Interpretation determines “the linguistic
understanding of the provisions at issue,”147 whereas construction
determines the “legal meaning” of a text.148 A text’s “legal meaning” includes “the authoritative meaning given to it by a judge,”
145. 418 U.S. 405, 413 (1974) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
632–33 (1943)).
146. I acknowledge that the default toward speaker meaning discussed below cannot
consistently work across the realm of fiction. Even if one focuses on author meaning in fiction, an author of a particular work of fiction can of course mean for readers to embrace
reader meaning of the work. The author of a great poem, for example, can entice readers
to become enmeshed in their own meanings that transcend and even contradict the author’s. A nonfiction speaker, however, who claims that the child he holds in his arms is
“his son” would not by that statement invite hearers to contradict his meaning. I will not
otherwise address fictional meaning in this Article. However, for those wishing to explore
whether interpretation of fiction might shed light on legal interpretation, Kent
Greenawalt provides an interesting discussion which ultimately concludes that “the differences between literary and legal interpretation are so great that an understanding of the
first will tell us almost nothing about how the debatable practical issues concerning legal
interpretation should be treated.” KENT GREENAWALT, REALMS OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION: CORE ELEMENTS AND CRITICAL VARIATIONS 137 (2018). That said, Professor Greenawalt does note, as would I, that “novels and poems, as well as biographies
and autobiographies, can teach us about human beings and our societies” and can thus
have “practical significance” for the law. Id. at 135–36. I would go further and raise this
claim to “great practical significance” for the law. See also Lloyd, supra note 45, at 132–36,
for the importance of the humanities in law and legal education.
147. Brian G. Slocum, Introduction, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT
JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 1,
5 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017) [hereinafter Slocum, Introduction].
148. See id.; Brian G. Slocum, The Contribution of Linguistics to Legal Interpretation,
in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL
INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 147, at 14, 16 [hereinafter Slocum, Contribution of Linguistics].
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whereas the “linguistic meaning” is “the meaning communicated
by the language of the text in light of the appropriate context of
the communication.”149 For example, one can imagine two parties
carefully addressing all the terms of a lease agreement for a term
of four years and video recording their careful reciting of all such
terms. Interpretation would involve discerning the linguistic
meaning of such provisions. Construction would involve determining the legal effect of such a video-recorded agreement. If, for
example, the applicable jurisdiction required leases of more than
three years to be in writing, then one must construe the lease as
unenforceable even though the linguistic terms might be easily
interpreted.
2. Actual Versus Hypothetical Speaker Meaning
Second, by “speaker,” one will find in the literature not only
references to actual speakers in question but also to such notions
as “a normal speaker of English, using [words] in the circumstances in which they were used”150 and “the reasonable maker of
statements.”151
Since hypothetical speakers by definition do not exist, they
cannot, without more, provide the actual mind required to interpret or generate speaker meaning.152 To resolve this semiotic difficulty, we must derive the meaning from a real speaker or reader
who can convey the necessary intentionality.153
For example, in reading a particular judicial opinion that finds
that a “reasonable maker of statements” would “intend” X, we
might derive the hypothetical speaker’s intent from the judge who
writes the opinion. We might say that she interprets the signifiers in ways that she believes such a hypothetical speaker would
do. We might, on the other hand, attempt to derive the meaning
from other actual speakers such as the majority of speakers of
English, and may even sample actual speakers to such an end.
149. Slocum, Contribution of Linguistics, supra note 148, at 16.
150. Karen Petroski, The Strange Fate of Holmes’s Normal Speaker of English, in THE
NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL
INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 147, at 105, 107 (quoting
Holmes).
151. Id. at 113 (referring to Justice Thomas).
152. See supra section VI.A.
153. See SEARLE, supra note 13, at 27–29 (on derived intentionality); see also supra section I.B.
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However, whomever we choose as the existing speaker or speakers to provide such derivative meaning (the “source speakers”),
the point is to remember that such meaning is in fact derived,
and that such meaning does not come from non-existent, hypothetical speakers who by definition cannot provide the actual intentionality required for meaning.
Although hypothetical speakers of course do not exist, the
source speakers and their meaning can be an object of inquiry in
the realm of public, nonfictional experience. Thus, as discussed in
section VI.D.4.b below, legislators and their meanings can be
such objects of inquiry where we derive legislative meaning from
such legislators in the manner discussed in such section VI.D.4.b
below.
3. Actual Versus Hypothetical Reader Meaning
Third, turning to readers, we can find distinctions in the literature between types of actual readers (such as between “ordinary
readers” and “extremely well informed” readers).154 We can also
see references to hypothetical readers of various characteristics,
including those having the ability to “perceive relevant factors
that are beyond the capacities of the vast majority of human
readers.”155 Thus, Justice Scalia would use for legislation a “reasonable reader,” an “objectivizing construct,” “who is aware of all
the elements (such as the canons) bearing on the meaning of the
text, and whose judgment regarding their effects is invariably
sound. Never mind that no such person exists.”156 I refer the
reader to section VI.B.2 above regarding the role of the derivative
meaning required for hypothetical persons.
4. Controlling Meaning Versus Controlling Signifiers
Finally, as we examine whose meaning controls, we should not
confuse questions of the signified with questions of appropriate
signifier use. As a matter of pure semiotics, we have seen that

154. Kent Greenawalt, Philosophy of Language, Linguistics, and Possible Lessons
about Originalism, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN
ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 147, at 46,
56–57.
155. Id. at 57.
156. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 393.
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signifiers can include, for example, potentially any “concrete object,” “abstract entity,” “idea or ‘thought,’” “perceptible [object],”
“physical event,” or “imaginable [object].”157
We must remember, however, that seeking an actual speaker’s
meaning conveyed by any such particular signifier is a separate
inquiry from examining the legality of the use of such a signifier.
For example, trademark law protects a “word, phrase, logo, or
other graphic symbol used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of others”;158 copyright
law protects “an original work of authorship (such as a literary,
musical, artistic, photographic, or film work) fixed in any tangible
medium of expression”;159 and criminal law would not permit killing a public official as a signifier of political protest.
Given such restrictions, a vendor’s intent, for example, that a
certain mark refer only to the vendor’s products of course does not
grant the vendor rights to use that mark if others have trademark protection for use of the mark. Although we may be able to
determine, as a matter of interpretation, that such a vendor
meant the mark only to refer to the vendor’s products (the vendor’s intended signified), trademark law can refuse him use of
such a signifier and thereby provide remedies to the lawful holder
of the mark. I further explore restrictions on signifier usage in
Part VIII below.
C. Whose Meaning of Signs Controls
In light of the foregoing, when determining whose meaning of
signs controls, I propose the following principle of interpretation
as the default starting position for nonfiction speech (or semiotic)
acts.
1. The Principle of Speaker Meaning
Under the “Principle of Speaker Meaning,” the actual speaker’s
meaning as it unfolds over time controls as a matter of interpretation where such speaker’s meaning is reasonably discernible,

157. NÖTH, supra note 8, at 80; see also 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.230.
158. Trademark, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (“In effect, the trademark is
the commercial substitute for one’s signature.”).
159. Copyright, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 158.
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even though the evidence may be sparse, conflicting, or otherwise
complex. One must thus attempt to make a reasonable determination of such meaning in light of the available evidence, however
sparse, conflicting, or otherwise complex. Under the Principle of
Speaker Meaning, such evidence includes all available intrinsic
and extrinsic evidence that may shed light on the speaker’s
meaning including, without limitation, the applicable speaker’s
(1) cognitive contexts; (2) physical and temporal contexts; (3) social, cultural, and human contexts; (4) discourse contexts; (5) textual or internal contexts; and (6) other relevant contexts.160
For example, we might determine a speaker’s meaning of “eye”
in the phrase “the evil eye” as meaning the “eye of a hurricane”
(rather than the eye of a person that can inflict harm) by looking
at such available contexts. We might thus look at the notion of
the hurricane then concerning the speaker (the cognitive context);
the speaker’s physical and temporal connection to the approaching hurricane (the physical and temporal contexts); the speaker’s
expressed concern with others about the community damage of a
direct hit by the hurricane (the social, cultural, and human context as well as the discourse context); and earlier references in
the speaker’s text to the hurricane (the textual or internal context). Such contexts might thus reasonably evince a meaning of a
hurricane eye rather than a human eye that can inflict harm.
2. Rationales for the Principle of Speaker Meaning
I propose this Principle of Speaker Meaning for multiple reasons. First, we cannot, without patent falsehood, claim that a
speaker’s reasonably discernible linguistic meaning is instead the
linguistic meaning of another person or entity unless, of course,
the speaker intends to incorporate others’ linguistic meanings.161
Second, if we fundamentally respect the right of speakers to
speak for themselves (and thus to be accountable for their mean-

160. See Lloyd, supra note 5, at 254–63. As discussed infra note 218, in the case of legislation, cognitive and discourse context includes legislative history. To the extent applicable law would limit the relevant intrinsic or extrinsic evidence that might be considered as
a matter of interpretation, the Principle of Speaker Meaning would counsel change.
161. As noted infra section VI.C.5, a person can, for example, incorporate into a document the meaning of others, as when one incorporates, without change, a particular concept of another. As also noted infra section VI.D.4.b.iv, legislators who do not read a bill
can incorporate or adopt the meaning of committee members or others who have advanced
a bill.
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ing and not for the meaning of others they do not embrace), we
cannot, as a matter of interpretation, respect such right yet substitute the meaning of another (whether actual or hypothetical)
for such speakers’ reasonably discernable linguistic meaning.
Third, as we shall also see in section VI.C.4.b, construction is better informed when it considers prior searches for actual speaker
meaning. Thus, Greenawalt correctly claims that “[a]ny plausible
argument for disregard of intentions must rest on claimed specific
obstacles, not ordinary understandings.”162
3. Evidence and the Applicable Standard of Proof
a. Varying Complexities of Evidence
In discerning actual speaker meaning, the available intrinsic
and extrinsic evidence may be straightforward, conflicting, otherwise complex, or nonexistent beyond any words that might have
been used. We must nonetheless attempt to do our best. For example, a speaker may say “X” yet claim that such statement was
meant ironically, or a speaker may both say “X” and “not X.” In
such cases, we must weigh all the evidence to attempt to find
whether the first speaker was indeed speaking ironically and
whether the second speaker truly contradicted herself. After reviewing all the evidence, we might find that the speaker’s expression of “not X” was a slip of the tongue and she therefore indeed
meant “X,” and that the first speaker truly spoke ironically.
Even where mixed evidence does not result from slips of the
tongue or other error, grappling with mixed or inconsistent meanings can result in usable linguistic meaning. To take an academic
example, a quantum theorist can usefully help scientists by exploring and speaking about light in mixed or contradictory ways
as both a particle and a wave. Additionally, a theologian can help
believers by exploring and speaking about how Christ is both God
and man. The Principle of Speaker Meaning would take such linguistic meaning in its contradictory senses in the contexts and for
the purposes used.163

162. GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 49.
163. Taking this further, the flexible logic of metaphor, for example, is essential to human thought and communication. See Harold A. Lloyd, Law as Trope: Framing and Evaluating Conceptual Metaphors, 37 PACE L. REV. 89, 99–101 (2016). Thus, we say both that
“time flies” (where time is mobile) and “we have made it through another week” (where
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Of course, speaker meaning may not be reasonably discernible
in certain cases. In those cases, we will have no choice but to turn
to construction (as enlightened by our failed search for linguistic
meaning), as discussed in section VI.C.4 below, to determine the
legal effect of such failure to find speaker meaning. We must do
this because adjudication demands resolution of disputes and
thus cannot be satisfied without determination of meaning. As
discussed in section VI.C.4.b below, construction is betterinformed when it considers prior searches for actual speaker
meaning, and the search for speaker meaning thus serves a critical function even where such meaning ultimately proves indiscernible.
b. Standards of Proof
In weighing evidence under the Principle of Speaker Meaning,
one must of course use an appropriate standard of proof for determining meaning. Although higher standards than preponderance of the evidence (such as clear and convincing evidence) are
usually required to use parol or extrinsic evidence “to contradict,
modify, or vary the terms of a written contract, or of a bill of lading, a deed, a lease, a note, a receipt, or a will,”164 the Principle of
Speaker Meaning would encourage careful reflection upon whether such heightened standards of proof should generally apply in
such cases as a matter of interpretation. Do we truly want a
heightened burden of proof that would give more weight to text
when other evidence of speaker meaning might be more compelling as a matter of interpretation? The Principle of Speaker Meaning would thus encourage careful reflection upon whether we
should use standards other than a preponderance of the evidence
when performing interpretation.165

time is stationary and we move instead). Id. at 100 (quoting GEORGE LAKOF & MARK
JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH 52 (1999)). For a detailed table outlining such metaphorical variation, based upon early childhood experience or later construction, see id. at
109–14.
164. 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1625 (2020); see id. § 1615 (noting that the preponderance of
the evidence standard is the default standard in civil cases unless a higher standard is
“necessary to protect important rights”).
165. The question of the appropriate standard of proof for interpretation is different
from questions of standards of proof that construction should demand in particular cases.
Due to space limitations, I generally leave this topic for another day. I do, however, explore in section VI.D.2 infra the possible limitations on adversely construing meanings of
criminal defendants.
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4. Defaults to Construction
a. Adjudication Demands Resolution
Where we cannot reasonably make linguistic sense in given
cases of mixed or otherwise-inconsistent meaning, or where we
cannot find any reasonably discernible speaker meaning, we must
then turn to construction to determine the legal effect of such
failure to find speaker meaning. Again, adjudication demands
resolution of disputes, and construction enlightened by our failed
search for linguistic meaning is the only remaining solution in
such cases.
b. Interpretation Attempts Enlighten Construction
Under the Principle of Speaker Meaning, such construction of
meaning should be enlightened by the failed attempt at interpretation for at least two reasons. Again, to the extent possible, we
should attempt to respect speakers’ linguistic meanings for the
reasons discussed in section VI.C.2. Additionally, even failed attempts at discerning speaker meaning can enhance construction
of speaker meaning. For example, if a vendor offers “fish” for sale
in semantically unresolvable ways that suggest both (1) the catch
of the day (except for trout) and (2) only flounder, construction of
the offer should not include trout even though we cannot otherwise resolve as a matter of actual speaker meaning whether the
offer is for only flounder or for a differing catch of the day other
than trout.
c. A Rebuttable Presumption of Rationality
Additionally, since speakers who are willing to be bound by
their offers presumably want their offers to be performable (and
contradictory offers are not performable to the extent they require the contradictory), the Principle of Speaker Meaning holds
that construction should presume that sellers intend to speak rationally unless the evidence establishes the contrary. This presumption can be similarly extended to all forms of legal speech
acts since most speech actors presumably intend that their legal
speech acts work and are thus coherent. Of course, not all speech
actors have such intent and thus the Principle of Speaker Meaning makes this a rebuttable presumption.
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d. Construing Meaning When Speaker Meaning Is Not Fully
Discernible
These observations can help us formulate a reasonable approach to the construction of meaning when speaker meaning is
not fully discernible. Such construction of meaning should strive
to respect the speaker’s meaning to the extent possible in light of
applicable law and lawful policy. It should thus (1) be enlightened
by evidence of actual speaker meaning even if such evidence does
not suffice to fully determine actual speaker meaning, (2) presume the rationality of the speaker unless the evidence proves
otherwise, and (3) act accordingly while following any applicable
law and lawful policy governing construction.
Thus, in the fish example above, trout would be excluded since
it would be inconsistent with the available evidence. Additionally,
the speaker should be presumed rational if the evidence does not
indicate otherwise. The conflicting evidence of fish offered for sale
can indicate speaker error rather than speaker irrationality, and
one instance of mixed evidence hardly seems sufficient evidence
of an irrational speaker. Presuming such rationality (and also attempting to construe meaning that is most consistent with all the
evidence) requires construing a meaning that threads both such
needles. Since flounder excludes trout and can otherwise be considered a catch of the day, construing flounder as the fish of the
day would seem to thread both needles and could thus be a reasonable construction. The Principle of Speaker Meaning does not
claim that the above approach will generate only one reasonably
possible construction of meaning in every case. Various cases may
generate multiple reasonable constructions of meaning, and judges must exercise their practical wisdom in determining the most
appropriate, reasonable construction of meaning. In section VI.D
below, I will return in more detail to the use of the Principle of
Speaker Meaning in both public and private law.
5. The Incorporation Caveat
As a caveat, however, to the Principle of Speaker Meaning,
such principle recognizes that a speaker can incorporate the concepts of others without intending to modify such concepts. In such
a case, the incorporated concepts remain unmodified and thus unfold over time as unmodified by the incorporating speaker. For
example, if the drafters of the Declaration of Independence meant
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to incorporate an independent “self-evident” concept “that all men
are created equal,” the incorporated “self-evident” meaning would
govern here. In such a case, if a drafter himself believed that only
white men fell under the concept of equality, that belief would by
definition not limit the externally incorporated concept.
Thus, in interpreting the Declaration of Independence, it would
be a mistake in such a case to give weight to what a drafter himself meant by the incorporated concept of equality of men in the
Declaration of Independence unless he instead meant to put his
own differing meaning on the concept. Instead, we should examine the philosophical and religious traditions in which this notion
arose and examine the relevant speakers and their meanings in
such traditions. We can call this recognition of the possibility of
incorporation the “incorporation caveat,” and for the sake of space
I will consider this incorporation caveat an unstated caveat running through the remainder of this Article.
6. The Concept/Conception Distinction
Another caveat to the Principle of Speaker Meaning is that one
must distinguish between concepts and conceptions. For example,
a speaker may have a concept of an automobile as a self-propelled
transportation vehicle having four wheels and operating on paved
roadways. When using that concept, however, a speaker may always have a particular conception in mind of a silver 2012 Prius.
That conception, however, is not to be confused with the speaker’s
broader concept of automobile. Thus, if that speaker bequeaths to
a friend all of his “automobiles,” that term would not be limited to
silver 2012 Priuses. I return to this distinction in section
VI.D.4.b.vi below.
D. Whose Meaning Controls: Some Applications of Interest to
Lawyers
In light of the discussions above, I shall now apply and test the
Principle of Speaker Meaning using several types of nonfiction
speech acts of interest to lawyers. Where useful, I shall also contrast construction with interpretation.
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1. Signs, Assertives, and Tort Law
I begin with a simple hypothetical to lay the groundwork for
more complex discussions that follow. Let us imagine that we
have a reasonably discernible speaker who, for example, asserts
that “John Smith is a thief.” The Principle of Speaker Meaning
requires us to seek the actual speaker’s meaning (as it unfolds
over time) if the actual speaker has communicated such meaning
with reasonable discernibility. Unless there is reasonably discernible evidence that the speaker meant to speak ironically and not
literally, we should interpret the speech as an assertion that
Smith is a thief. If, however, the reasonably discernible evidence
suggests such irony, we should interpret such speech ironically.
However, as a matter of construction, we might reach a different result. If our speaker’s irony takes on a literal meaning in the
general public that harms Smith in a way that we feel defamation
law should discourage, we might as a matter of such law construe
the legal effect of the words literally. For lack of space, I take no
position here on the propriety of doing so. I raise the point merely
to make the logical distinction between interpretation and construction of individual assertive speech acts so that we might
build upon the distinction in the discussion that follows.
2. Signs, Commissives, and Criminal Law
In Elonis v. United States,166 the defendant posted online a semiotic array of items which on their face could be seen as threatening. For example, mixing the indexical, iconic, and symbolic,
the defendant posted a photograph (index) of a coworker and
himself where he held a toy knife (icon) to the neck of the coworker and included the caption “I wish” (symbol).167 After he was
subsequently fired, the defendant posted such language as “Y’all
think it’s too dark and foggy to secure your facility from a man as
mad as me?”168

166. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); see also Lawrence M. Solan, Linguistic Knowledge and Legal Interpretation: What Goes Right, What Goes Wrong, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM
LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 147, at 66, 71–72.
167. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
168. Id.
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The defendant also posted about his wife. Such posts included:
“Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my
wife?”169 After his wife obtained a “three-year protection-fromabuse order” against the defendant, the defendant posted the following online:
Fold up your [protection-from-abuse order] and put it in your pocket
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?
Try to enforce an Order
that was improperly granted in the first place
Me thinks the Judge needs an education
on true threat jurisprudence
And prison time’ll add zeros to my settlement . . .
And if worse comes to worse
I’ve got enough explosives
to take care of the State Police and the Sheriff’s Department.170

The defendant also posted:
That’s it, I’ve had about enough
I’m checking out and making a name for myself
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius
to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever imagined
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a Kindergarten class
The only question is . . . which one?171

As a result of these and other posts, the defendant was charged
and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which criminalizes the
transmission in interstate commerce of “any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.”172
How should the Principle of Speaker Meaning apply here? Although his wife and former coworkers were “afraid and viewed
[the defendant’s] posts as serious threats,”173 the speaker’s intent
governs linguistic meaning here for the reasons discussed above.
This, again, is a separate question from (1) construction of legal
meaning (as when, for example, a statute construes a contractual
price as a reasonable price when the parties have not specified
their price) and (2) the wisdom or appropriateness of speaker
meaning as a moral or social matter. Thus, as a matter of interpretation, we must examine evidence of actual speaker meaning,

169. Id.
170. Id. at 2006.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2004 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)).
173. Id. at 2007.

LLOYD 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/22/2021 8:57 AM

SEMIOTICS IN LEGAL THEORY, PRACTICE, AND EDUCATION

905

including but not limited to the words as evidence, to determine
such linguistic meaning.
Among other things, holding a toy knife to someone’s throat
and using words such as “kill” and “bullet” can no doubt be possible evidence of contempt for the defendant’s coworkers and wife
as well as possible evidence of threatened harm. However, statements posted by the defendant (such as “Art is about pushing limits”174) and words uttered by the defendant in court (such as
claims that his posts modeled well-known rap lyrics175) might
suggest artistic intent—though many, if not most, of us might
find such artistic intent a difficult sell.176 As to linguistic meaning, depending on analysis of all other evidence in the case, we
might interpret the speaker’s meaning as committing a threat.
We might also find the meaning as mixed or even incoherent given the potentially conflicting evidence. If we find mixed meanings, we might find some of the meanings as committing threats
while others do not. On the other hand, we might be unable to
reasonably interpret either the parts or the whole in light of the
interactions of such mixed meanings. When speaker meaning is
not reasonably discernible for this or other reasons, such as lack
of evidence, as noted in section VI.C.4 above, we must turn to
construction to determine meaning and its legal effects.
Additionally, even where speaker meaning is reasonably discernible, where a statute applies, we must also construe the legal
effects of such meaning. Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires construction of the legal meaning and effects of (1) the posts and (2)
any relevant speaker intent, however discernible.177
Here, the district court convicted the defendant of threats under the statute, holding that conviction “required only that [the
defendant] intentionally made the communication, not that he intended to make a threat.”178 The court of appeals upheld the conviction, holding that the statute only required “the intent to
communicate words that the defendant understands, and that a
174. Id. at 2006.
175. Id. at 2007.
176. The speaker could also intend the same words to express contempt, threats, and
forms of the aesthetic.
177. Again, for the reasons set forth supra in sections VI.C.2 and VI.C.4.b, this in no
way diminishes the importance of interpretation and discerning speaker meaning where
reasonably possible.
178. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
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reasonable person would view as a threat.”179 The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, focusing on the jury instruction “that the
Government need prove only that a reasonable person would regard [the defendant’s] communications as threats.”180 Rejecting
this approach as effectively substituting a negligence standard for
the criminal intent typically required by criminal statutes, the
Supreme Court found such criminal intent would be “satisfied if
the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be
viewed as a threat.”181
The tests for legal meanings recognized in the various stages of
this case thus differ greatly. The district court required no intended threat,182 while the Supreme Court, somewhat more in
line with the Principle of Speaker Meaning, required demonstrating speaker “purpose” or “knowledge,” holding, again, that the
criminal mental state required by the statute is met if the defendant communicates “for the purpose of issuing a threat, or
with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a
threat.”183
Given the high stakes of a criminal conviction here, it makes
sense that we should, in general, have less flexibility in construing meaning or intent that a criminal defendant might not have
meant or intended in light of the available evidence. We can
therefore have cases like Elonis where we might well believe that
there was a linguistic threat while nonetheless using a higher

179. Id.
180. Id. at 2012.
181. Id. at 2011–12 (holding that “Federal criminal liability generally does not turn
solely on the results of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state” and noting Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 294 (1895), which held that a defendant could
encounter ‘‘liability in a civil action for negligence, but he could only be held criminally for
an evil intent actually existing in his mind.”) The Court thus reversed and remanded the
case. Id. at 2013.
182. Id. at 2007.
183. Id. at 2012. I say “somewhat more in line” because the “knowledge” prong of this
test may deviate from the Principle of Speaker Meaning to the extent such prong recognizes unintended commissives. For example, one might genuinely write verse with no intent
to threaten anyone while knowing that some will nonetheless feel frightened. See Solan,
supra note 166, at 71–72 (noting fright as “a side effect”). That said, of course, we might
have legal, lawful policy or other lawful reasons for finding a threat as a matter of construction just as we might construe ironic speech as defamatory as suggested supra section
VI.D.1.
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burden of proof that finds no such threat as a matter of criminal
construction.184
3. Signs, Commissives, and Private Law
Having first explored a public law example of potential commissives, we can now turn to some private law examples. In exploring whose meaning should control in cases of private law
commissives, I will briefly examine the interpretation and construction of wills and then turn to the interpretation and construction of contracts.
a. Signs and Wills
I treat wills as commissives because they commit the testator’s
estate to do certain things. In the case of a single testator, it is
hard to disagree with Greenawalt that “the intentions of the
writer who has died are obviously key, since the will is designed
to carry out her intentions.”185 From the standpoint of interpretation, it is therefore hard to see how the right linguistic meaning is
not the meaning of the author of the will, i.e., the speaker’s or author’s meaning. In this regard, Professor Greenawalt gives us the
example of the testator who named in his will a person he did not
know, “Robert J. Krause,” rather than “Robert W. Krause,” a
“close friend and employee.”186 Because this apparently involved
mistaken reliance on a telephone book, the court followed the author’s more likely intent.187 In light of the Principle of Speaker
Meaning, the court’s action seems quite correct as a matter of interpretation since there was reasonable evidence of which of the
two Krauses had a close relationship to the testator. Again, since
184. As Solan notes: “the Supreme Court made it clear that proving that Elonis intended his wife to draw inferences that would cause her to be intimidated was necessary to establishing that a crime has been committed. Until then, the literal meaning of these verses would be taken at face value.” Solan, supra note 166, at 72.
185. GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 11. Greenawalt observes that matters may be
more complex “if a married or unmarried couple has reached an agreement about what the
will of each would provide. In that event, one might see a will as more like a contract.” Id.
For sake of space, I will keep my discussion of will to that of a single testator who has
made no such agreement, and I will discuss contracts in a separate section below.
186. Id. at 15.
187. Id. Such result can be seen as either a “correction” of the will or applying the
proper meaning of the signifier “Robert J. Krause.” Although either frame reaches the correct result, from a semiotic standpoint it would seem more precise to say that the court
sought the correct meaning of the signifier “Robert J. Krause.”
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the purpose of a will is to dispose of a testator’s property as the
testator intends,188 it runs afoul of such purpose to substitute for
the actual author’s meaning the meaning of some hypothetical
ideal author or the meaning of readers whether actual or hypothetical.
As for construction of the legal meaning of the will, one can
strongly argue that construction should not reach a different result. Robert J. Krause was presumably not relying on receiving
the property at issue so no reliance concerns should generate a
different legal meaning. Additionally, as Greenawalt points out,
reliance arguments in the case of wills can often seem of little
weight since a testator can generally change his will at will (no
pun intended), and “most potential recipients do not actually see
the wills of their benefactors.”189
Potential reasons for construing the meaning in favor of Robert
J. Krause as written—such as (1) will drafters’ and courts’ need
for “clear and consistent interpretations of similar language,” (2)
the difficulty of “discerning after someone’s death what was really
intended,” and (3) guarding against the possibility that evidence
of different meanings of terms such as “Robert J. Krause” could
be manipulated190—do not apply here. Names vary so there is no
“similar language” to construe consistently. Furthermore, it
should not be difficult to determine that the testator employed
and was close friends with Robert W. Krause rather than Robert
J. Krause. Given all this, there is little reason to worry about improper manipulation of meaning when recognizing that “Robert J.
Krause” really meant the testator’s employee and close friend,
Robert W. Krause. Construction should thus converge with interpretation in finding such a meaning.
b. Signs and Contracts: Williston, Corbin, and More
i. A Case of Apples
One can imagine a case where both a seller and a buyer intend
“apples” to mean only golden delicious apples. If that seller agrees
to sell such “apples” to that buyer upon written lawful terms

188.
189.
190.

See id. at 11.
Id. at 15.
See Greenawalt, supra note 154, at 50.
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which both parties are using in the same way, the parties’ linguistic meaning of “apples” no doubt covers only golden delicious
apples. Applying a different meaning of some hypothetical speaker of English or of some other reader (actual or hypothetical)
would change what the parties meant and would thus fail as a
matter of interpretation.
This seems straightforward, and Steven J. Burton tells us that
“American courts universally say that the primary goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the parties’ intentions at the
time they made their contract.”191 To the extent the parties’ intentions are reasonably discernible, the Principle of Speaker
Meaning squarely accords with this “primary goal” and with interpreting “apples” in the contract above to mean golden delicious
apples.
As for construction, it is also difficult to justify (without more) a
different meaning for “apples” here. In construing contracts,
courts may, of course, recognize other goals than enforcing speaker meaning. Such goals include (1) fostering “the security of
transactions,” including clarity for the parties and their assignees
“about their rights, duties, and powers”; (2) fostering “the peaceful settlement of disputes non-arbitrarily, in accordance with the
Rule of Law,” which includes predictable contract interpretation
that is “coherent with the law of contracts generally”; and (3)
“formulating legal rules that are administrable by the courts and
by the parties.”192
Here, however, the seller and buyer are the only parties affected by the contract, and their meaning of “apples” is reasonably
discernible. Construing the contract in accordance with their
meaning secures their deal, fosters peaceful and non-arbitrary
dispute settlement by treating the parties as they intended, and
proves to be administrable by turning on reasonably discernible
meaning and requiring that the parties act just as they intended.

191. STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 1 (2009).
192. See id. at 2, 7–8; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 6, 111 (noting concerns
such as judges being asked to perform functions they cannot reasonably perform, respecting needs of a “just and healthy society,” and promoting “general fairness and efficiency”).
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ii. Contracts: Literalism, Objectivism, and Subjectivism
Having addressed both interpretation and construction of the
“apples” contract above, we can now turn to three schools of
thought addressing the reading and enforcement of contracts.
First, “literalism . . . holds that the literal meaning of the contract’s governing word or phrase, as found in a dictionary, determines the parties’ rights, duties and powers.”193
Second, “objectivism . . . looks for the parties’ intentions as expressed (manifested) in the contract document as a whole and its
objective context, but not the parties’ mental intentions”; in other
words, it looks for “manifested intention, as a reasonable person
familiar with the objective circumstances would understand the
manifestations,” and thus “infers reasonable meaning(s) from the
parties’ manifestations of intention in light of the circumstances,
whether or not the meaning(s) reflect what the parties had in
mind as the meaning of the terms they used.”194 Thus, for example, Samuel Williston looks to “the natural meaning of the writing
to parties of the kind who contracted at the time and place where
the contract was made, and [under] such circumstances as surrounded its making.”195
Third, “subjectivism . . . looks for the mental intentions or
knowledge of the parties when they manifested their intentions,
taking into account all relevant evidence,” although it does not
recognize intentions which are not expressed.196 Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides: “Where the parties
have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a
193. BURTON, supra note 191, at 2.
194. Id. at 2, 6, 51.
195. Id. at 29 (quoting 4 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 607 (3d ed.
1957)).
196. Id. at 2, 28; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 23–24 (discussing the Restatement (First) of Contracts’ “complex objective approach” turning on the “meaning that
would be attached . . . by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the circumstances . . . other than oral statements by the parties of
what they intended the words to mean” and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ “more
subjective approach”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (AM. LAW INST. 1932);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Additionally, the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) notes that “the
relevant intention of a party is that manifested by him rather than any different undisclosed intention.” The Restatement (First) reflects Williston’s objectivism while the Restatement (Second) reflects Arthur Corbin’s greater subjectivism. See KENT GREENAWALT,
LEGAL INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES AND PRIVATE TEXTS
265–67 (2010).
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term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.”197
As phrased, the literalism option can be quickly dispatched for
both interpretation and construction. Since words typically have
multiple definitions and can thus have multiple “literal” senses,
literalism cannot work as a matter of interpretation. Even if parties to a contract have used terms in a dictionary sense, the dictionary (with its multiple definitions of terms) cannot itself tell us
which sense the parties used. Additionally, literalism would lead
us astray where parties have not used terms in a standard or
“dictionary” sense. Literalism fares no better with construction.
Given multiple “literal” definitions of terms, construction also requires more than just a dictionary. If a judge is to construe contracts in accordance with the dictionary meanings of terms, a
judge must have some method of determining which of these “literal” dictionary meanings apply.
Objectivism also fails for both interpretation and construction.
Since it would divorce itself from the parties’ “mental intentions,”
and, in Williston’s words, would look for “the natural meaning of
the writing to parties of the kind who contracted at the time and
place where the contract was made, and [under] such circumstances as surrounded its making”198 rather than what the parties actually meant, such “objectivism” cannot work as a general
rule of interpretation. If the parties’ meaning is reasonably ascertainable, interpretation should give them that meaning for the
reasons set forth in section VI.C above. Objectivism also fails as a
general rule of construction. Again, if the seller and buyer are the
only parties affected by the “apples” contract and their meaning
of “apples” is reasonably discernible, why should they not have
their contract for golden delicious apples? Again, construing the
contract in accordance with their meaning secures their deal,
should foster peaceful and non-arbitrary dispute settlement by
treating the parties as they intended, and should prove quite administrable by turning on reasonably discernible meaning and
requiring that the parties act just as they intended.
Of the three approaches above, this leaves us with “subjectivism,” the approach which “looks for the mental intentions or
knowledge of the parties when they manifested their intentions,
197.
198.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
BURTON, supra note 191, at 29.
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taking into account all relevant evidence.”199 As an approach to
interpretation, this approach, on its face, accords with the emphasis that the Principle of Speaker Meaning places upon speaker
meaning. As a matter of construction, this approach would also
give the seller and buyer in the “apples” contract above their contract for golden delicious (and only golden delicious) apples. In doing so, this approach would also construe the contract in accordance with the parties’ meaning, securing their deal. It would
likely foster peaceful and non-arbitrary dispute settlement by
treating the parties as they intended, and should prove highly
administrable by turning on reasonably discernible meaning and
by requiring that the parties act just as they intended. Common
construction policies are thus advanced by such an approach.
Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts correctly interprets and construes the following similar example:
A and B are engaged in buying and selling shares of stock from each
other, and agree orally to conceal the nature of their dealings by using the word “sell” to mean “buy” and using the word “buy” to mean
“sell.” A sends a written offer to B to “sell” certain shares, and B accepts. The parties are bound in accordance with the oral agreement.200

This example squarely accords with the Principle of Speaker
Meaning to the extent the parties’ odd use of terms is reasonably
ascertainable. As for construction, recognizing the parties’ meaning secures their deal, should foster peaceful and non-arbitrary
dispute settlement by treating the parties as they intended, and,
again, should prove quite administrable by turning on reasonably
discernible meaning and by requiring that the parties act just as
they intended.
A change of facts could, of course, change this result as a matter of both interpretation and construction. For example, as a
matter of interpretation, if A and B both die and their heirs are
left to settle the contract, A’s and B’s speaker meaning may no
longer be reasonably discernible.201 If such speaker meaning is no
199. Id. at 2.
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1981);
see also BURTON, supra note 191, at 28.
201. Again, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
provides: “Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement
or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.” However, again, the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) also notes that
“the relevant intention of a party is that manifested by him rather than any different un-

LLOYD 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/22/2021 8:57 AM

SEMIOTICS IN LEGAL THEORY, PRACTICE, AND EDUCATION

913

longer reasonably discernible, then construction would step in to
determine the meaning and its legal effects.
Even where linguistic meaning is reasonably discernible, construction can nonetheless result in a legal meaning of contract
terms that differs from their linguistic meaning. Again, in enforcing contracts, courts may recognize other goals than respecting
speaker meaning, such as (1) fostering “the security of transactions,” including clarity for the parties and their assignees “about
their rights, duties, and powers”; (2) fostering “the peaceful settlement of disputes non-arbitrarily, in accordance with the Rule
of Law,” which includes predictable contract interpretation that is
“coherent with the law of contracts generally”; and (3) “formulating legal rules that are administrable by the courts and by the
parties.”202
Under these changed facts where the death of A and B leaves
their original speaker meaning no longer reasonably discernible,
these construction goals may well require construing “buy” to
mean “buy” and “sell” to mean “sell.” Fostering peaceful resolutions of disputes may itself suffice for such construction where
there is no reasonably discernible evidence that such terms were
used in their opposite senses.
A different change of facts could also raise construction concerns, such as promoting “security of transactions.” If, for example, the contract is assigned while A and B are still living, and the
assignee does not know that A and B had orally agreed to alter
the meanings of “buy” and “sell,” promoting “security of transactions” strongly weighs in favor of construing “buy” to mean “buy”
and “sell” to mean “sell” to protect the “innocent” assignee. Since
the assignor (A or B) would be in a superior position of
knowledge, the assignor in such a case should be forthright in informing the assignee of any special meaning of terms.203
disclosed intention.” In this changed hypothetical, to use the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) terminology, the original “manifested” intent may no longer be discernible.
202. BURTON, supra note 191, at 2, 7–8; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 146, at 6, 111
(noting concerns such as judges being asked to perform functions they cannot reasonably
perform, respecting needs of “a just and healthy society,” and promoting “general fairness
and efficiency”).
203. Thus, where parties have differing meanings as to terms, the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) sensibly addresses such differing
meanings in terms of which party is at fault, and § 201(3) recognizes no mutual assent
where meanings differ and neither party knew the other’s meaning or should have known
such meaning. See also BURTON, supra note 191, at 62 & n.109.
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4. Signs and Directives
In exploring whose meaning should govern in the case of directives, I next explore the question of legislation and speaker meaning. For the reasons discussed below, the Principle of Speaker
Meaning should again control interpretation where reasonably
possible. For reasons of space, I limit my discussions here to interpretation and do not explore construction.
a. Signs and Legislative Intent
To apply the Principle of Speaker Meaning in legislation, we
must be able to identify the relevant speaker and speaker intent.
This is, of course, more complex than identifying the speaker and
speaker intent in the case of a single testator or in the case of the
two individual parties to the “apples” contract above. Given the
multiple parties involved in legislation—the legislators and the
executive who signs such legislation, not to mention staff and
others who may be involved in drafting legislation—identifying
the relevant speaker and speaker intent may seem daunting and
even impossible. Additionally, since a legislature is not itself a
thinking being, we might ask whether it can ever make logical
sense to speak of a legislature as a speaker or to speak of a legislature's intent.
b. Signs and Legislatures as Speech Actors
In tackling these issues, we should remember that we create
our concepts and that we judge them by their workability.204 We
should thus recognize with Gerald MacCallum, Jr., that the question here is not just “Are legislatures capable of intent?” We
should also be asking whether the notion of legislative intent is
useful.205 If such a concept is useful, we should fashion a concept
of legislative intent in a way that works most effectively.

204.
205.

Lloyd, supra note 27, at 264–74 (discussing workability).
See GERALD C. MACCALLUM, JR., LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW,
POLITICS, AND MORALITY 34–35 (Marcus G. Singer & Rex Martin eds., 1993). Some would
go further than such pragmatic inquiry and maintain that the concept of legislative intent
is too entrenched in our common discourse to be entirely avoided. See L.M. SOLAN, THE
LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 115 (2010) [hereinafter SOLAN,
LANGUAGE OF STATUTES] (“I do not believe that any judge or commentator can consistently
maintain that courts should dispense altogether with discussion of legislative intent. The
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Such a concept is no doubt useful. It continues (and helps us
grapple with) a long judicial tradition of seeking “legislative intent,” a tradition that respects the “principle of legislative supremacy” by recognizing the supremacy of laws enacted by the
legislature.206
Additionally, understanding “legislative intent” as part of a legislative speech act is consistent with Constitutional references to
Congress as an actor. For example, Article I speaks of “legislative
Powers” that are “vested in” Congress, and speaks of each house
of Congress being the “Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.”207 How can we speak of Congress
as such a rational Constitutional actor if we cannot also find a
way to speak of its having intent to act in certain ways?
i. Signs and Legislatures’ Speech Acts
We must, then, find a workable way of speaking of legislative
intent. Consistent with the recognition above that we speak of
legislative institutions (such as Congress) as both acting and as
having intent, I would find legislatures themselves (not some
combination of legislators) as the relevant speakers or speech actors. Consistent with that approach, I would then maintain that a
legislature’s legislative (and thus directive) speech act occurs
when a sufficient majority of legislators have voted in the manner
provided by law to pass a legislative proposal offered for debate.208
In other words, a legislature itself speaks legislatively upon the
passage in the manner provided by law of legislative proposals offered for debate.209 I would thus sympathize with Richard Ekins’
claim that instead of a “sum of the intentions held by each member of the majority,” “what is held in common amongst legisla-

concept is just too deeply embedded in the way we see the world . . . .”).
206. M.B.W. Sinclair, Legislative Intent: Fact or Fabrication?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1329, 1331 (1997); see also SOLAN, LANGUAGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 117 (“After
all, intent is a rule-of-law value.”).
207. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 5.
208. See Bill, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 158; RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE
OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 230–31 (2012); WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE
AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 37–41 (8th ed. 1993) (summarizing and diagramming
how “a bill becomes a law”).
209. See EKINS, supra note 208, at 230–31.
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tors” is a common “proposal” they deliberate and vote upon.210 I
would use “common” here to refer to the group activity involved in
debating and voting upon such proposals. That said, the question
thus becomes what is the meaning of such a group proposal that,
when passed, becomes the legislative speech act of the legislature.211
ii. Signs and Interpreting Legislatures’ Speech Acts212
To answer this question, we necessarily turn to the concepts
and conceptual frameworks used by the legislators in the legislative process to the extent such concepts and conceptual frameworks are reasonably discernible.213 For if bills use concepts and
conceptual frameworks other than those used by the legislators
involved in the legislative process,214 those legislators would have
debated and voted upon concepts and conceptual frameworks other than the ones they debated and voted upon. That would be
nonsense, not to mention inconsistent with the very notion of legislative consideration and debate.215

210. Id. at 231.
211. As Peirce reminds us, “nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign.” 1 & 2
PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.306. Thus, we must ask whose interpretation controls and we
cannot fail to address that question when we speak of a common “proposal” along the lines
of Ekins. See EKINS, supra note 208, at 231. Additionally, though any such legislative proposal will have been passed at a specific point in time, that is not to say that better and
fuller understandings of such legislative speaker meaning cannot thereafter develop over
time, or that such speaker meaning itself does not unfold over time. See infra Part VII.
212. In addition to the linguistic meaning of a statute, construction of the statute can
(as in the case of other speech acts) provide a legal meaning different than the linguistic
one. For example, in accordance with the lenity canon, a court might construe a statute
more narrowly than its linguistic meaning. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 191–93 (2007). Thus, a court might construe a criminal statute in favor of “modern reader understanding” in light of the “general principle that people
should receive ‘fair warning’ of what behavior is criminal.” See GREENAWALT, supra note
146, at 63.
213. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. Again, though any such legislative
proposal will have been passed at a specific point in time, that is not to say that better and
fuller understandings of such legislative speaker meaning cannot thereafter develop over
time, nor that such speaker meaning itself does not unfold over time as discussed in Part
VII, nor that construction cannot provide different meanings over time.
214. These meanings, under the applicable contexts, could of course differ from “dictionary” or other non-legislator meanings.
215. The legislators thus provide the necessary derivative meaning for the words and
meanings debated. See supra sections I.B & VI.B.2; see also SEARLE, supra note 13, at 27–
29 (on derived intentionality). Again, this is not to say that better and fuller understandings of such legislative speaker meaning cannot thereafter develop over time, nor that
such speaker meaning itself does not unfold over time as discussed infra Part VII, nor that
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Additionally, using meanings assigned by other speakers or
hearers would effectively usurp the legislators’ role. As Michael
Sinclair puts it, “[l]egislators are elected . . . . [and t]o allow [a]
‘hearer’s’ meaning to triumph . . . would be anti-democratic and
would allow the triumph of non-elective law making over the
normal, elective law-making.”216
iii. A “Dozen” Cakes
Thus, one can imagine legislators debating and passing a bill
regulating the price of a “dozen” cakes where the term “dozen” is
used by all the legislators to mean “twelve.” The legislators’ linguistic meaning would thus not include other meanings such as a
baker’s dozen (thirteen). This would hold even though a baker’s
dozen might have been a more common meaning in reference to
cakes at the time, even though a reasonable non-legislator reader
(whatever that might mean) of the time might have understood
“dozen” here to mean a baker’s dozen, and even though the executive signing the legislation into law might have understood dozen
here to mean a baker’s dozen. A different understanding by such
executive cannot, consistent with rule of law, change the meaning
of such a passed bill. Allowing such a change of meaning would
effectively shift legislative functions to the executive branch by
allowing the latter to alter the meaning of legislation and thereby, in effect, to act legislatively. Additionally, allowing such a
change would again have the nonsensical result of legislators
having debated and voted upon meanings they did not debate and
vote upon.
Consistent with the Principle of Speaker Meaning, the conceptual framework used by the legislators thus gives us the initial
meaning of the legislation, which meaning is then unleashed into
experience to develop through time as discussed in Part VII below.
iv. Mixed or Indiscernible Meaning
Of course, we can have situations where discerning speaker
meaning can be more difficult than in the example above, and
can, in fact, even be impossible. For example, as Professor Slocum
construction cannot provide different meanings over time.
216. See Sinclair, supra note 206, at 1388.
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notes, “due to the enormous volume of legislation and other reasons, most legislators do not read most of the text of the statutes
on which they vote.”217 To the extent this is true, one might despair of ever finding how legislators used terms.
However, one must remember that all forms of relevant context
constitute evidence218 as further explored in the Monarch case in
section VI.D.4.b.v below. Such context, for example, may show
that legislators who did not read the text may have adopted or incorporated the meaning of others more actively involved in drafting the text.219 To the extent we can find any evidence of such
speaker meaning (including contextual or other evidence) when
performing interpretation, the Principle of Speaker Meaning requires giving such evidence weight for the reasons discussed
above, including rule of law reasons that require avoiding the improper “triumph of non-elective law making.”220
As I have written before, the pragmatics of finding speaker
meaning is often complex, and reasonable minds can often disagree as to the results of such a process.221 Not only is this the case
with ordinary judges of speaker meaning, it is also the case with
judges having the characteristics of the “ideal” judge Eunomia.222
Law, however, requires answers in particular cases, and we must
do our best to find and provide such answers in a way that, again,
avoids an improper triumph of nonelective law making.”223
To do this, if we ultimately find either that (1) speaker meaning is mixed or inconsistent in unworkable ways, or (2) meaning
217. Slocum, Contribution of Linguistics, supra note 148, at 33.
218. Thus, the Principle of Speaker Meaning would look to legislative history to the
extent relevant and would consider as part of the legislative and cognitive discourse “materials from the process of enactment that indicate how a bill is understood” and would
consider “[t]he primary . . . reports of committees that screen and revise bills, statements
made by sponsors on the floor of the legislature about what bills mean, and actual changes
in the texts of bills as they proceed towards passage.” See Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional
and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 278 (2004) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation].
219. See supra section VI.C.5 on the incorporation of other speakers’ meaning; see also
SOLAN, LANGUAGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 96 (“In reality, legislators do not generally think much about small details, understanding that these have been delegated to a
small group of members . . . . [and] it serves no democratic function to require the courts to
pretend otherwise by ignoring this aspect of the legislative process.”).
220. See Sinclair, supra note 206, at 1388.
221. See generally Lloyd, supra note 5. See also Lloyd, supra note 27, at 244–50.
222. See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 244–50.
223. See Sinclair, supra note 206, at 1387–88.
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simply cannot otherwise be ascertained, rule of law requires such
an honest conclusion after a genuine and thorough inquiry. Turning to construction in either case does not involve an improper
“triumph of non-elective law making.” In either such case, we attempted to find workable speaker meaning, and, in its absence,
we necessarily turn to the judicial branch which is charged with
resolving disputes about meaning and the effects of such meaning. Additionally, construction as proposed in section VI.C.4 respects speaker meaning to the extent set out in such a proposed
approach.
v. Killing “Monarchs”
All that said, we should not underestimate the power of context
in resolving otherwise indiscernible legislator meaning, even in
the absence of legislative history. For example, one can imagine a
statute that simply reads “monarchs can only be killed in the
month of June” and includes no definition of “monarch.” One can
also imagine that all the legislators involved are dead, and that
no legislative history for the statute survives. Does the statute
permit regicides in the month of June or does it address something else?
In the absence of a definition of “monarch” in the statute and in
the absence of any legislative history, we can still look at relevant
other contexts. If, for example, all legislators swore to uphold the
laws of the land and these laws forbade murder, it is difficult to
see how “monarch” could plausibly mean “king” or “queen.” This
would be all the more true if such legislators operated in a system
with a king or queen as head of state who would not assent to
such legislation.
We can also look at still other contexts. Imagine, for example,
that the statute was passed at a time when newspapers and other
non-legislative historical records note the near unanimous consent among the public that insects should be protected from extinction and that limiting the hunting of monarch butterflies to
the month of June was imperative to that insect’s survival. Given
that context alone, interpreting “monarch” as the monarch butterfly could be quite defensible. Of course, we could have other
conflicting contexts. For example, newspapers might also speak of
endangered monarch beetles known only in that jurisdiction
which should also only be hunted in the month of June if they are
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to be preserved. If exhausting all relevant contexts cannot resolve
the butterfly/beetle quandary, then construction must step in and
determine meaning and its legal effect (and perhaps conclude
that “monarch” means both the butterfly and the beetle). Were
this to occur, this would again show the importance of interpretation preceding construction. Interpretation removes the possibility of the statute’s condoning murder and thus the possibility of
its being construed as unenforceable on that ground.
vi. Concepts Versus Conceptions
As a further caveat to the search for speaker meaning here, one
must also recall the concept/conception distinction made in section VI.C.6 above. For example, in the statute regulating a “dozen” cakes, half of the legislators may have had conceptions of
chocolate cakes while the other half may have had conceptions of
vanilla cakes. In all such cases, however, they could have shared
the same more general concept of “cake” as “a sweet baked food
made from a dough or thick batter usually containing flour and
sugar and often shortening, eggs, and a raising agent (such as
baking powder).”224 Thus, there would be no difference in legislator speaker meaning here despite the differing conceptions.
Additionally, the concept/conception distinction helps us avoid
formulating and thus freezing meaning too narrowly. If all of the
legislators had shared the conception of “cake” as chocolate cakes,
it would be wrong to limit the meaning of the concept of cake only
to chocolate cakes. Similarly, if all the legislators shared the same
concept of firearm as a weapon that uses gunpowder to discharge
its shot while at the same time also sharing the same conception
of a firearm as a pistol, it would be wrong to limit such a concept
to pistols. Thus, the Principle of Speaker Meaning is not misguided by forms of interpretation that might limit meaning to original
conceptions. Further exploring how conceptions (and even concepts) can unfold over time, I also discuss in more detail the unfolding of sense though time in section VII.B below, as well as the
unfolding of reference through time in section VII.A below.

224.

See Cake, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014).
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vii. Meanings as Used in the Legislative Process
Finally, one should also note that the Principle of Speaker
Meaning seeks the legislators’ concepts and conceptual frameworks public used in debates and other public legislative processes. It does not seek their secret motives, other secret desires, or
other secret intentions. The Principle of Speaker Meaning is thus
not plagued by questions involving such secret motives, other secret desires, or other secret intentions.
c. Scalia’s Less-Tethered Hypothetical Directive Meaning
To put the integrity and strength of the Principle of Speaker
Meaning in further context, Justice Scalia and his followers instead rely purely on hypothetical constructs. Claiming that we
are “governed by what the laws say, and not by what the people
who drafted the laws intended,”225 Justice Scalia would, again,
use his “reasonable reader”, an “objectivizing construct,” “who is
aware of all the elements (such as the canons) bearing on the
meaning of the text, and whose judgment regarding their effects
is invariably sound. Never mind that no such person exists.”226
Of course, those concerned with improper judicial activism
should worry about judges using such a hypothetical reader construct. Again, for the reasons discussed above in section
VI.D.4.b.ii, rule of law cannot prioritize reader over legislative
speaker meaning in statutory interpretation.227 Additionally, if
we do not include the Principle of Speaker Meaning within “all
the elements (such as the canons) bearing on the meaning of the
text,” we increase judicial interpretive discretion. We do that by
ignoring restraints and suggestions of meaning provided by the
Principle of Speaker Meaning.228
225. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 375.
226. Id. at 393.
227. See Sinclair, supra note 206, at 1388.
228. To continue with “monarch” statutes, one can imagine, for example, a statute that
simply reads “monarchs are banned.” Imagine also that the only reference to what “monarchs” means is in the legislative history, and resort to legislative history is banned. See
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 388 (“[U]se of legislative history is not just wrong; it
violates constitutional requirements of nondelegability, bicameralism, presidential participation, and the supremacy of judicial interpretation in deciding the case presented.”). A
“reasonable reader” here might therefore read that term as referring to either butterflies
or kings. Such an approach no doubt leaves much more room for “judicial activism” here
than the approach of the Principle of Speaker Meaning—at least where reliance on legisla-
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5. Signs and Verdictives
As another example of speech acts involving groups, I next explore whose meaning should control in verdictives (which again
consist of such speech acts as convicting, acquitting, and fact finding).229 To do this, I explore a hypothetical jury that finds a defendant negligent in a slip and fall case and awards the plaintiff
damages in the amount of $100,000.
Although not an enduring entity like a legislature, the jury’s
group speech acts require a certain number of votes of members
of the body. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide that “[u]nless the parties stipulate otherwise, the verdict
must be unanimous and must be returned by a jury of at least
[six] members.”230
For purposes of the example here, we can posit a jury of six
persons in a civil case where a majority rather than a unanimous
verdict is required. After several days of deliberation, the jury, by
a vote of five to one, finds a defendant drugstore negligent in a
slip and fall case and awards the plaintiff damages in the amount
of $100,000. One of the jurors did not think the drugstore was
negligent. Although five of the jurors found the drugstore negligent, none of them individually initially thought $100,000 was
the proper damage amount. They each had different amounts in
mind but finally compromised on $100,000 as a fair amount.
On these facts, the jury’s (not the jurors’) verdictive speech act
is the determination that the defendant was negligent and that
the grant to the plaintiff should be a damage award of $100,000.
This verdictive speech act is not some sum of the individual intents or acts of six separate jurors (or of the subset of five who
voted in favor of the verdict). Instead, it is the verdictive speech
act of the jury as a separate entity, which speech act occurs because the requisite majority of jurors voted to find liability and to
award damages in the compromise amount of $100,000, an
amount differing from the amount individual jurors would have
awarded without need of compromise.

tive history is banned.
229. AUSTIN, supra note 131, at 153.
230. FED. R. CIV. P. 48(b).
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However, as with legislators in the legislative examples above,
that is not to say that individual jurors’ meanings, statements
and purposes are irrelevant to the interpretation and construction of the group verdict. Similar to the meaning of legislative
speech acts discussed above, the meaning of the jury’s speech act
is the meaning of the verdict debated by the jurors and approved
by the requisite number of votes. Also similar to the case of legislative speech acts, meanings used by the jurors control the linguistic meaning of the verdict. If the jurors’ meaning did not control, they could not have had a meaningful debate since they
would have nonsensically debated meanings other than the ones
they debated. Additionally, if their meanings did not control, rule
of law would be subverted by use of meaning from those other
than the jurors empowered to render a verdict.
Thus, to underscore the role of the jurors’ meaning, the jurors
can be polled to confirm each juror’s vote.231 If, for example, a
tired foreman erroneously left a zero off the jury’s verdict form
and filled out the verdict form with the sum “$10,000” rather
than “$100,000,” the jury can be polled to verify the award
amount.232 In such a case, the jurors’ intent for “$10,000” to mean
one hundred thousand dollars should of course be controlling.
Additionally, turning from interpretation to construction, if, for
example, the dissenting juror has evidence that the five voted
against the drugstore because they were bribed, the dissenting
juror should of course be heard in considering whether the verdict
should be construed as unlawful.233
When reading the jury’s verdict form, there should therefore be
little question that the Principle of Speaker Meaning should control here as a matter of interpretation. We can reasonably discern
both the jurors’ identity and their intent as to the verdict the majority approved. Reader meaning, on the other hand, might find
an erroneous “plain meaning” of $10,000 unless the reader was
aware of the actual jurors’ meaning and factored that meaning
into interpretation. But would this not return us to the jury’s
speaker meaning as understood by the jurors? The Principle of
231. FED. R. CIV. P. 48(c).
232. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3) (addressing “Answers Inconsistent with the Verdict”);
FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(4) (addressing “Answers Inconsistent with Each Other and the Verdict”).
233. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(B) (permitting jurors to testify regarding whether
“an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror”).
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Speaker Meaning thus soundly directs us to the actual verdictive
speech act as understood by the actual jurors.
VII. MEANING AND TIME: SIGNS, ORIGINALISM, AND THE FIXATION
OF MEANING DEBATE
Having addressed multiple aspects of the semiotics of meaning,
we can now briefly turn to the semiotics of meaning and time.
Even though meaning is not transcendentally fixed,234 there remains the question of whether meaning somehow becomes fixed
within our webs of signs at the time such meaning is first signified. For example, Justice Scalia’s version of the “fixed-meaning
canon” holds “that words must be given the meaning they had
when the text was adopted.”235 To address claims of fixation, we
must first distinguish between the reference and the sense component of meaning and provide an answer for each.
A. Time and Reference of Signs
With respect to the reference component of meaning within our
webs of signs, in many cases, we can consider fixation the default
(but only the default) position, even though such reference is not
transcendentally fixed. If, for example, we say that a lawyer gave
a speech on March 14, 2019, we would ordinarily say reference to
the speech itself remains fixed within our discourse even though
we may from time to time reach different conclusions as to what
was meant by that speech. That is, we might debate the meaning
of the speech over time, but we would ordinarily say that we are
referring within our discourse to the same speech.
However, though fixation is thus the initial default with reference, we can nonetheless say that reference can and should
change in certain situations within our discourse. For example, if
we learn that X rather than Y was the first person to write a treatise on the interpretation of contracts, we will thus change the
reference of the phrase “the first person to write a treatise on contracts” from Y to X. Since reference is not transcendentally
fixed,236 we can make such correction. Thus, reference can be re234.
235.
236.
provide

See supra section II.B.
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 428.
See supra section II.B.1.a. Although reference is not transcendentally fixed, it does
stability in the rule of law. Taking again our butterfly statute that provides “mon-
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fined or changed by refining definite descriptions as discussed
above in section II.B.1.a.
B. Time, Sense, and the Meaning of Signs
For at least the four reasons discussed below, fixation of sense
claims are at best tautological and at worst erroneous. First, since
sense is the total actual and possibly conceivable ways in which
notions unfold or can unfold in experience,237 “freezing” or fixing
such sense at best simply “fixes” such sense as such possible as
well as actual unfoldings in ever-unfolding and ever-changing experience. Such a “fixation” thus hardly rules out possibilities of
sense changing as experience always continues to unfold.238
Second, since meaning plays out in ever-changing experience,
such experience itself brings its own changes to the unfolding of
meaning. We now, for example, must debate whether “marriage”
in an older statute includes same-sex marriage given the social
and legal changes in the concept of marriage. Marriage now
means something very different today239 than it meant when only
members of the opposite sex could marry, when women were belittled by coverture,240 or when many heterosexual blacks were
barred from the institution entirely as slaves.241 Thus, we also
now see such definitions of marriage as “[a] legal union between
two persons that confers certain privileges and entails certain obligations of each person to the other, formerly restricted in the
United States to a union between a woman and a man.”242 This

archs are banned,” the sense of “monarch” cannot shift through time to mean “royal head
of state” without a corresponding change in the reference. Such unlinking a statute from
one referent and linking it to a radically different referent no doubt requires appropriate
state action if we are to have rule of law. Again, this is not to say that the sense, understanding, or both of monarch cannot unfold over time. We can discover new colors of the
monarch; we can come to see the monarch as no longer endangered; we can come to see the
monarch in new symbolic ways, etc. See infra section VII.B.
237. See supra section II.B.2.a.
238. As explored in Part VII above, we could non-tautologically speak of affixation of
meaning such as whose meaning should we affix to certain signs.
239. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
240. See generally Amber Bailey, Comment, Redefining Marriage: How the Institution
of Marriage Has Changed to Make Room for Same-Sex Couples, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER &
SOC’Y 305 (2012).
241. See generally Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave Marriage in the United
States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299 (2006).
242. Marriage, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th
ed. 2016) (emphasis added).

LLOYD 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

926

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

4/22/2021 8:57 AM

[Vol. 55:861

definition notes how the concept of marriage has unfolded
through time by highlighting the removal of a once-necessary element: a union of those of the opposite sex.243 Consistent with this
unfolding of the concept of marriage through time, Peirce eloquently and presciently tells us that:
A symbol [such as a word], once in being, spreads among the peoples.
In use and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words as force,
law, wealth, marriage, bear for us very different meanings from
those they bore to our barbarous ancestors.244

Third, precedent presents an obvious legal example of such experiential change. A court’s determination of statutory meaning
is legally binding so long as the precedent lasts or until the legislature amends the statute to provide other meaning.245 Precedent
thus broadly presents problems for any alleged fixation of meaning unless perhaps one considers the possibility of “relying on
precedents” as part of the original meaning. But if “relying on
precedents” is part of the original meaning, this would reaffirm
that the meaning is not fixed but can change as precedent requires.246
Fourth, such fixation claims are wrong to the extent they ignore the fact that speakers can actually intend for their concepts
to unfold over time. For example, legislation may involve openended terms such as “reasonable” or “unfair” which invite the
court to provide meaning.247 Additionally, a group of legislators,
for example, could intend that a statutory concept of “marriage”
for which they vote should evolve in accordance with lessdiscriminatory lay concepts of marriage that unfold over time.
243. See id.
244. 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.300. As Blake also powerfully notes: “Reason, or
the ratio of all we have already known, is not the same that it shall be when we know
more.” WILLIAM BLAKE, There Is No Natural Religion, in POEMS AND PROPHECIES 4 (1991).
245. See, e.g., 21 C.J.S. Courts § 183 (2020) (“The doctrine of ‘stare decisis’ incorporates
two principles: (1) a court is bound by its own prior legal decisions unless there are substantial reasons to abandon a decision, and (2) a legal decision rendered by a court will be
followed by all courts inferior to it in the legal system.”); see also id. § 220 (“An even more
extraordinary and compelling justification is needed to overturn precedents involving statutory interpretation because unlike in constitutional cases, if the precedent or precedents have misinterpreted the legislative intention embodied in a statute, the
legislature's competency to correct the misinterpretation is readily at hand.”).
246. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 154, at 55–56.
247. See, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 212, at 203; see also Greenawalt, Constitutional and
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 218, at 275 (“Legislatures adopt some provisions with
open-ended phrases that definitely envision that those who apply the law will make judgments consonant with changing circumstances.”).

LLOYD 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/22/2021 8:57 AM

SEMIOTICS IN LEGAL THEORY, PRACTICE, AND EDUCATION

927

Furthermore, where the purpose of a statute is to govern future
behavior, would it not be reasonable to imagine that those involved in the passage of the statute assumed (unless perhaps
they tried to include a fixation clause along the lines discussed
below in this section VII.B) that meanings of the statute would
unfold in sensible ways in such future experience?
One can also, of course, give countless lay examples of such intended unfolding of sense. If I write a letter to a friend telling him
that he is always welcome at “my house,” it would not make sense
in such an endless invitation for the meaning of “my house” to be
frozen as of the time of writing. I am not inviting my friend to a
house frozen in time beyond reach but to a house that exists in
time and thus changes in physical and other ways, including social ways. As social standards (such as desirability and price), for
example, unfold over time, understandings of “my house” will unfold accordingly in those regards as well.
Finally, even at one point in time, one cannot know all the possible conceptions of a concept that might exist—though one can
and should know this limitation of one’s knowledge. Thus, we can
share the same concept of cake at a given point in time despite infinite possible conceptions of cakes of various tastes, colors,
shapes, and so on, none of which excludes the others from falling
under the concept of cake.
In light of all these points, we can return briefly to Justice
Scalia’s version of the “fixed-meaning canon” which, again, provides “that words must be given the meaning they had when the
text was adopted.”248 Could we perhaps make more sense of Justice Scalia’s canon by modifying it to apply only to statutes which
expressly include a “freezing” or fixation clause such as: “terms
used in this statute shall have the meanings in effect as of the
date of passage of this statute”? Even ignoring how we should
handle the specific phrase “meaning in effect” (whose meaning?
Does “meaning” here mean conception rather than concept?), it is
hard to see how such a modification would work. First, we have
the problem with precedent discussed above. Second, we cannot
comprehend such “frozen” meanings apart from how they actually
248. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 428. Justice Scalia does, for example, temper
this canon with such provisos as his “principle of interrelating canons” (“No canon of interpretation is absolute. Each may be overcome by the strength of differing principles that
point in other directions”) and his recognition that “general terms may embrace later
technological innovations.” Id. at 16, 59.
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and possibly play out in ever-unfolding and ever-changing experience. Third, the meaning of the fixation clause itself (as with all
other meaning) would unfold over time. But to say all this, of
course, is to say such meanings are not fixed except perhaps,
again, in the tautological sense that the meanings involved are
the meanings involved. But, again, meaning consists of possible
as well as actual unfoldings in ever-unfolding and ever-changing
experience. Such a tautology thus hardly rules out possibilities of
meaning changing as experience always continues to unfold.
C. Time and Application of Signs
Those who would “freeze” or fix meaning249 might try to respond that applications or extensions of concepts change rather
than the concepts themselves. For example, such persons might
maintain that the original concept of marriage above has not
changed but that instead we now have new “extensions” or “applications” of the term “marriage.” Such persons might claim that
marriage is a general concept that does not purport to name every
person, place, thing, or event to which the concepts possibly extend.250 They might claim that such general concepts give us the
“criteria” or other guidance we need to determine what specific
things or events are included within the concepts; for example,
the concept of “green” gives us the “criteria” or other guidance we
need to pick out actual green things in the world.251 Those who
would “freeze” or fix meaning might thus attempt to parse between concepts (which do not change) and applications of those
concepts, where applications may include applications not contemplated at the time of a statute’s passage.
The unfolding of the concept of marriage through time, however, involves change to the very criteria of what constitutes marriage. Where a union of members of the opposite sex was an original element of the concept of marriage,252 current application of

249. See, e.g., id. at 435 (“A legal text should be interpreted through the historical ascertainment of the meaning that it would have conveyed to a fully informed observer at
the time when the text first took effect.”). Of course, would not a fully informed observer at
any time know that concepts can unfold over time in unforeseen directions?
250. As Michael Sinclair notes, “[a] legislature cannot normally enact extensions; they
would be simply too particular.” Sinclair, supra note 206, at 1370.
251. See, e.g., id. at 1358.
252. Marriage, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 242.
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the concept of marriage to same-sex parties would be impossible
without a change in the very concept of marriage that eliminates
the opposite-sex requirement. Additionally, again, the meaning of
the “criteria” given by concepts for application of such concepts
cannot be fully fixed since we cannot comprehend “frozen” meanings outside of the very time and unfolding of experience required
to comprehend and apply them at any point in time.
In saying this, however, I do not deny that we apply concepts.
Judicial opinions, for example, of course apply concepts when
such opinions apply rules to the case at hand. However, such application is necessarily performed in the context of then-unfolding
experience, which experience bears the marks of prior experience
to date. Additionally, I fully acknowledge the importance of application since sense itself unfolds through experience, and application involves such unfolding of sense. One cannot therefore have a
reasonable grasp of concepts apart from reasonably grasping such
unfolding of meaning through appropriate application. Thus,
Gadamer can correctly say that “[a]pplication does not mean first
understanding a given universal in itself and then afterward applying it to a concrete case. It is the very understanding of the
universal—the text—itself.”253 For the fullest sense of “understanding,” I would therefore agree with Gadamer that “understanding always involves applying the meaning understood.”254 If
sense unfolds through experience, how could we say otherwise?255
This point is magnified by the fact that sense is determined by
context,256 and that the sense of context, like other sense, also unfolds through experience.257 However, in addition to the unfolding
253. GADAMER, supra note 98, at 336. I would also agree that “[i]t is only in all its applications that the law becomes concrete. Thus, the legal historian cannot be content to
take the original application of the law as determining its original meaning.” Id. at 322.
254. Id. at 328. I thus also agree with Gadamer that “application is neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole from the beginning.” Id. at 321.
255. Cf. 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 1.219 (“What I mean by the idea’s conferring
existence upon the individual members of the class is that it confers upon them the power
of working out results in this world, that it confers upon them, that is to say, organic existence, or, in one word, life.”).
256. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at xxvii (“Nothing but conventions and contexts cause a symbol or sound to convey a particular idea.”).
257. As I am not dealing with pragmatics in detail in this Article, I will not also explore
problems finding “fixed” sense that result from any differences in experience and understanding of an author and a reader. See, e.g., 5 & 6 PEIRCE, supra note 6, at 5.506 (discussing the imprecision flowing from the fact that “no man’s interpretation of words is based
on exactly the same experiences as any other man’s”); GADAMER, supra note 98, at 272
(“The recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives the her-
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of meaning through time by the applications of concepts through
time, I would be clear that concepts themselves (as with the case
of marriage above) can evolve through time in ways that change
application itself.
D. Time and Signifier Drift
In addition to such evolving meaning of the signified through
time, signifiers can also refer to different or additional signifieds
over time. For example, the Middle English verbal signifier for a
road was “rode”258 though the signifier “rode” now signifies the
past tense of “ride.” Such signifier drift through time is often used
as a primary argument by originalists: we must, the argument
goes, be originalists to avoid confusion in light of such signifier
drift.259
This argument, however, does not address the fact that the
signified (such as the meaning of the word “marriage”) can unfold
over time as well. Instead, this argument focuses on the different
case of signifier drift. If the signifier “X” signified the concept A
when used in a statute but now signifies the concept B, we must
of course recognize that the original statute signifies the concept
A rather than the concept B. However, this does not mean that
we should ignore the ways the concepts A and B themselves unfold over time.
Confusing signifier drift with the unfolding of concepts through
time thus risks conflating the signifier with the signified (and we
might add that fallacy to the list of logical fallacies lawyers
should avoid). That we must now, for example, interpret the Middle English “rode” as road260 when applying a Middle English
“rode” statute is logically distinct from the fact that the concept of
a road can unfold through time. Similarly, interpreting Shakespeare’s use of “Marry” in an original archaic sense of expressing
“indignant surprise”261 where appropriate is logically distinct
from the fact that the concept of marrying or marriage can unfold
meneutical problem its real thrust.”).
258. See Road, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 112.
259. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 78, 82 (discussing what Queen Anne may
once have meant by “awful, artificial, and amusing”).
260. See Road, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 112.
261. See 1 ALEXANDER SCHMIDT, SHAKESPEARE LEXICON AND QUOTATION DICTIONARY
696 (3d ed. 1971).
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over time. Thus, judges and lawmakers can recognize that sense
unfolds over time in the way discussed above.262 Signifier drift
categorically differs from the unfolding of the sense of concepts,
and a careful semiotics avoids conflating the two.263
VIII. SOME BRIEF CLOSING THOUGHTS ON FIRST AMENDMENT
SEMIOTICS
Grappling with the signifier, the signified, whose meaning
should control in various situations, and correlations between the
signifier and a signified can also help refine free-speech analysis.
Although deep explorations of semiotics and free speech are beyond the scope of this introductory Article on semiotics and the
law, I can outline a few remarks on the subject. These remarks
presume reasons commonly given for protecting speech: protecting democracy and our right to self-governance,264 permitting “the
search for knowledge and ‘truth’ in the marketplace of ideas,”265
protecting “individual autonomy, self-expression, or selffulfillment,”266 and fostering tolerance.267
A. Freedom of Speech and Signifier Types
Good First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that words
are not the only signifiers of expression. The American flag, for
example, is no doubt a symbol of America, and burning that flag
can therefore symbolize, for example, disapproval of America or
American policy. If so intended, flag burning can thus be symbolic
expression despite Chief Justice Rehnquist’s general claim that
“flag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar
that, it seems fair to say, is most likely to be indulged in not to
express any particular idea, but to antagonize others.”268 Of
262. See supra section VII.B.
263. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 78, 82.
264. See generally James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011).
265. Id. at 502 (setting forth the rationale while contending that “a completely unregulated market of ideas will lead to discovery of truth is highly contestable”).
266. Id. at 502–04; Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 498–503 (1998) (“First Amendment analysis [should] attend
more self-consciously to the speaker’s development through expression.”).
267. Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
979, 984–85 (1990).
268. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 432 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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course, burning a flag can also be non-symbolic where there is no
expressive intent. Burning a flag, for example, can be a proper
means of flag disposal and need express nothing beyond the desire to dispose of a flag properly.269 Or, on the other hand, by virtue of proper disposal, such flag burning might be seen as great
respect for the flag itself or the country it represents.
B. Freedom of Speech and Harmful Signifiers
However, it does not follow from the fact that anything can
serve as a signifier that all things are fair game for signifiers and
free expression as a matter of law. Again, trademark law protects
a “word, phrase, logo, or other sensory symbol used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its products or services from those of
others”;270 copyright law protects “an original work of authorship .
. . fixed in any tangible medium of expression,”271 and criminal
law would not permit killing a public official as a signifier of political protest.272 In each of these cases, freedom of speech analysis
must balance the harm of violence to rights or to persons against
any harm of limiting expression. Exploring such a balance in detail is beyond the scope of this Article. However, I can address below the potential fungibility of signifiers as one available balancing tool in certain cases.

269. 4 U.S.C. § 8(k). See also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411 (stating that federal law holds
burning to be the preferred means of disposing of a flag that is no longer fit for display).
270. Trademark, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 158 (also noting that “[i]n effect, the trademark is the commercial substitute for one’s signature”).
271. Copyright, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 158. One might by copyright
analogy justify, as a matter of construction, prohibitions against protestors disrupting for
political expression a funeral designed by others to convey a message of sorrow and good
remembrance. I have explored other rationales for such restrictions elsewhere. See generally Harold A. Lloyd, Crushing Animals and Crashing Funerals: The Semiotics of Free Expression, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 237 (2013).
272. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (“The First
Amendment does not protect violence.”); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 493
(2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it
most certainly does not protect violent criminal conduct, even if engaged in for expressive
purposes.”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (“The First
Amendment has never been construed to protect acts of violence against another individual, regardless of the motivation or belief of the perpetrator.”). I have also written elsewhere on restrictions on using living beings as signifiers. See Lloyd, supra note 271, at
244–45, 282–83.
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C. Freedom of Speech and Fungible Signifiers
1. Draft Cards
If a non-harmful signifier can signify just as well as a harmful
one, a good grasp of semiotics supports balancing interests and
requiring use of the non-harmful signifier rather than the harmful signifier. Using the non-harmful signifier, the speaker speaks
just as clearly, and harm to others is avoided. For example, if
burning an excellent copy of a draft card conveys the same sense
of protest to unwitting viewers conveyed by burning an actual
draft card, where is the free-speech need to damage an official
document such as a draft card?273
2. Cookies
Continuing to balance harms, we can also imagine a cookie
baker who offers his famous and easily identifiable cookies for retail sale, who claims that his cookies are his works of art celebrating heterosexuality and condemning homosexuality, who has
made his views on sexual orientation well known, and who therefore refuses to sell his cookies to gay customers.274 In other words,
he claims his cookies are signifiers for expressive (if not also assertive) speech acts.275 Given that anything can be a signifier, this
sort of example is of great importance if we worry that freedom of
speech may be used as cover for discrimination or other pernicious purposes.
Signifier fungibility can provide an answer here as well. The
cookie baker can choose other signifiers that at least equally convey his celebration of heterosexuality and his condemnation of
homosexuality, signifiers that in fact might convey such celebration and condemnation more precisely. For example, putting his
thoughts and rationales to words can perhaps express them more
273. Discussing this iconic option would have bolstered the Court’s decision upholding
a draft card mutilation statute in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Though
modern color photocopying technology would be easy to make an exact duplicate for burning, prior to such technology, a folded piece of paper or one in an envelope, for example,
could perhaps have passed as the real card before an audience.
274. Due to space limitations, I discuss this simpler case of the cookie baker who refuses to sell to gay customers. I hope to do a future article on the semiotics of Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (involving a wedding
cake baker who refused to sell a wedding cake to a gay couple).
275. See supra section V.A.
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clearly than would such unconventional signifiers as cookies. If
so, requiring other fungible signifiers would thus not require discrimination against gay customers while still permitting the
baker’s free (and perhaps more precise) expression.
If other fungible signifiers exist for his message (including
words which may be more precise means of expression), how
would prohibiting discriminatory cookie sales on the level of signifier analysis (1) infringe on the baker’s right to speak on matters of public concern, (2) interfere with the battle of truth in the
marketplace of ideas, (3) endanger his right to “self-expression,”
or (4) improperly (after balancing the harm of discrimination
against the fungibility of signifiers) circumscribe his autonomy
and self-fulfillment as a matter of expression?276
3. Jackets
Of course, where signifiers are not so reasonably fungible, such
lack of reasonable fungibility can support the use of such signifiers where, for example, harm to others does not outweigh use of
such signifiers. An excellent example of such lack of fungibility
would be signifiers uniquely conveying emotional meaning, such
as Mr. Cohen’s “Fuck the Draft” jacket worn in the corridors of
the Los Angeles County Courthouse in 1968.277
D. Freedom of Speech and Correlation of the Signifier and the
Signified
Notwithstanding the reasoning above, however, might the
cookie baker above reasonably argue that some sort of objectionable compelled expression occurs if he must sell his cookies to gay
people?
1. Symbolic Concerns
If the cookie baker uses his cookies to celebrate heterosexuality
and condemn homosexuality, does compelling him to sell his cook276. See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text on reasons for free speech protection.
277. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In that case, Mr. Cohen
used that phrase to express publicly “the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War
and the draft.” Id. at 16.

LLOYD 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/22/2021 8:57 AM

SEMIOTICS IN LEGAL THEORY, PRACTICE, AND EDUCATION

935

ies for use at a gay celebration compel him to express a contrary
message? If his cookies are used at such a celebration, do they not
now convey celebration rather than condemnation?
Semiotics helps us see how no compelled expression exists here
for at least two reasons. First, under the Principle of Speaker
Meaning, the cookie baker’s meaning is unimpaired. The baker’s
cookies are famous, easily recognizable, and his views are well
known. Second, signifiers can be put to non-expressive use without impairing the speaker’s meaning. For example, I can use a
treatise as a doorstop without impairing or changing the speaker’s meaning. Similarly, a gay celebration can put out cookies
solely for purposes of refreshment without impairing or changing
the speaker’s meaning. As such, again, one cannot reasonably
claim that the sale of cookies to gay people endangers the baker’s
right to speak on matters of public concern, interferes with the
battle of truth in the marketplace of ideas, endangers the baker’s
right to self-expression, or circumscribes his autonomy, selfexpression, and self-fulfillment as a matter of expression.278
2. Additional Indexical Concerns
Apart from the meaning the baker attaches to his cookies, if his
cookies are used at a gay celebration and everyone at the celebration is aware that the cookies came from his bakery, does this
physical connection with the celebration in itself not indicate either celebration of homosexuality or, at the very least, the baker’s
involvement with, and thus approval of, a sexual orientation he
condemns? In asking such a question, we are in fact asking at
least two indexical questions.
First, we are asking whether the baker’s mere physical connection through the sale itself indicates views disavowed by the
baker. This is not a difficult question. On the purely transactional
level, a retailer simply sells his goods, and the acceptance of the
price and tender of the goods therefore simply indicate such a
sale. There seems little more to be said on this point of pure logic.
However, we must also ask whether sale of the cookies could
also indicate mental attitudes of the baker. For example, an individual’s donation to a political party may reasonably indicate
278.
tion.

See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text on reasons for free speech protec-
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support of that party (although it can indicate other things such
as desire to gain favor). Though mental states can be thus indicated, it is hard to find indexical expression here of mental states
supporting the gay party or anything gay at all. Again, the baker
is in a retail business and thus presumably sells cookies to many
whose views he rejects. It is hard to see how the default state of
mind indicated here is anything more than simply a retail one.
Should one have any doubt, the baker’s views on homosexuality
are well-known and should thus clarify any such doubts.
Thus, one cannot reasonably claim that any indexical meaning
of the sale of cookies to gay people endangers the baker’s right to
speak on matters of public concern, interferes with the battle of
truth in the marketplace of ideas, endangers the baker’s right to
self-expression, or circumscribes his individual autonomy, selfexpression, and self-fulfillment.279
Due to space limitations, I must end my First Amendment
comments here. I hope, however, to see others probe such semiotics—including courts—as they wrestle with the extent and limits
of freedom of speech.
CONCLUSION: SEMIOTICS AND THE MIDDLE PATH
Having now examined the utility and insights of semiotics for
those involved in legal theory, practice, and education, I end by
first pointing out two opposing paths that one might wrongly take
after an exploration of semiotics. I then end by noting a sensible
semiotics that threads between such opposing erroneous paths.
Since signifiers can effectively include any concrete, abstract,
tangible, or intangible thing (such as any “concrete object,” “abstract entity,” “idea or ‘thought,’” “object perceptible,” “physical
event,” or “imaginable” object,)280 and since meaning is not transcendentally given,281 one must carefully gauge one’s reaction to
that vastness of potential signifiers and their potential signifieds.
Taking such care, one must not abandon all restraint and believe that one can assert, direct, commit, declare, or express282
279. See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text on reasons for free speech protection.
280. NÖTH, supra note 8, at 80; see also 1 & 2 PEIRCE, supra note 7, at 2.230.
281. See supra section II.B.1.
282. See supra Part V (discussing the various types of speech (semiotic) acts).
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anything as signified with anything as signifier. As I have written
before, both semantic and pre-semantic experience would push
back against such unlimited license.283 For example, if one steals
a trademark, directs actions with words that no one can comprehend, or claims to a police officer that “stop” means “go,” one may
well experience failure or loss. Additionally, one must take care
that the vastness of potential signifiers is not used as “free
speech” cover for unlawful or harmful behavior when, for example, other reasonably fungible signifiers exist, or when semiotic
analysis otherwise exposes such cover as mere cover.
All that said, one must not cower in the face of that vastness of
potential signifiers and signifieds by seeking comfort in wrong beliefs284 in formalism (i.e., in beliefs that the law is “a selfcontained system of legal reasoning” involving deduction of neutral and apolitical results from “general principles and analogies
among cases and doctrines”285). Again, since referents and sense
are not transcendentally given, and since reality is “internal” to
our semantic lifeworlds,286 we can always have hope of seeking
change where progress requires. Additionally, since sense itself
unfolds in experience over time, one cannot speak of the law in
any meaningful way as a “self-contained” system severed from
such unfolding of sense in experience over time.
Unlike the approaches above, a sensible semiotics must by definition actually work.287 It must take a middle path between (1)
formalism lost in a “self-contained” system, impossibly severed
from the unfolding of sense in experience, and (2) any semiotics of
unlimited license. Semiotics shows us that such a middle path
must also be a “hermeneutic” path, i.e., a path involving interpretation. One cannot workably address what one does not comprehend. To comprehend, one must have workable notions of both
meaning and interpretation, which allow one to “present [some283. Lloyd, supra note 27, at 222–50.
284. See id. at 210–22 (describing various freedoms we have in, for example, framing,
creating meaning, and adjusting categories).
285. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 16 (1992) (defining formalism).
286. See PUTNAM, supra note 33, at 114 (“the internal realist . . . is willing to think of
reference as internal to ‘texts’ (or theories), provided we recognize that there are better
and worse ‘texts.’ ‘Better’ and ‘worse’ may themselves depend on our historical situation
and our purposes; there is no notion of a God’s-Eye View of Truth here.”); Lloyd, supra
note 27, at 210–22, 232–34.
287. I have addressed workability in detail elsewhere. See Lloyd, supra note 27, at
264–71.
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thing] in understandable terms” and “to explain or tell the meaning of [that something].”288 I have therefore called this middle
path “hermeneutic pragmatism” to reflect both the required
pragmatism and the required understanding of meaning and interpretation.289 In this middle path, in this sensible semiotics, in
this hermeneutic pragmatism lies law’s soundest way to achieving sensible and ever-unfolding justice and rule of law.

288.
289.

Interpret, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 224.
See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 201.
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APPENDIX
Some Further Useful Terms and Concepts
I. Three Subdivisions of Semiotics
Charles Morris classically provides a useful definition of three
subdivisions of semiotics: pragmatics, semantics, and syntactics.
Pragmatics “is that portion of semiotic which deals with the
origin, uses, and effects of signs within the behavior in which
they occur.”290 Understanding pragmatics as the study of how individuals in actual practice use words and other signs, I have
written about the subject elsewhere and will not explore in detail
many of the matters I have previously addressed.291 Pragmatics
is, of course, an extremely important subdivision of semiotics for
lawyers. Much of what we do involves how a particular person or
entity used language, such as struggling with what they meant by
a word or words which they used.
Semantics “deals with the signification of signs in all modes of
signifying,” and syntactics “deals with combinations of signs
without regard for their specific significations or their relation to
the behavior in which they occur.”292 This Article explores semantics to the extent it explores the signified but does not explore
syntactics.293
II. Semiosis Versus Semiology and Tokens Versus Types
To help readers as they explore semiotics further, I note here
three distinctions readers will likely encounter.
First is the distinction between “semiotics” and “semiosis.”
“Semiosis” is “the process of meaning-making”; this includes
meaning-making involved in the interaction of the signified and
signifier.294 The term also refers to “signification as a process” or
290. CHARLES MORRIS, SIGNS, LANGUAGE AND BEHAVIOR 219 (1946).
291. See generally Lloyd, supra note 5.
292. MORRIS, supra note 290, at 219.
293. Nöth describes the three branches as follows using “sign vehicle” for “signifier”:
syntactics “studies the relation between a given sign vehicle and other sign vehicles,” semantics “studies the relations between sign vehicles and their designata,” and pragmatics
“studies the relation between sign vehicles and their interpreters.” NÖTH, supra note 8, at
50.
294. See CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 259 (referring in Peircean fashion to the signifier
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“the activity of signs”295 and “the process of sign interpretation.”296 It can also mean “any sign action or sign process” or “activity of a sign.”297
Second is the distinction readers may see between “semiotics”
(referring to work within the tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce,
which tradition this Article follows) and “semiology” (referring to
work within the tradition of Ferdinand de Saussure).298 Saussure’s views299 are generally beyond the scope of this Article,
which again follows the tradition of Peirce.
Third is the distinction between tokens and types. As Nöth
puts it, “A sign in its singular occurrence is a token, whereas the
sign as a general law or rule underlying its use is a type.”300 Taking the word “fast” as an example: “As a word of the English language it is a type. Every written or spoken instance of that is a
token.”301 Thus, if a paragraph uses the word “contract” four
times, there will be four tokens of the English-language word.
III. Signs and Lifeworlds
Lawyers exploring semiotics in any depth will encounter the
terms Lebenswelt (or lifeworld), Umwelt, and Innenwelt. Although the first of these three terms is likely familiar to many
lawyers, I will briefly address all three terms. Assuming that language shapes experience,302 I favor Putnam’s definition of the

as “representamen” and the signified as “the object and the interpretant”).
295. Semiosis, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEMIOTICS (Paul Bouissac ed., 1998).
296. Short, supra note 74, at 105.
297. VINCENT M. COLAPIETRO, GLOSSARY OF SEMIOTICS 178 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
298. See CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 259.
299. Saussure took a synchronic approach to semiotics, studying “a phenomenon (such
as a code) as if it were frozen at one moment in time.” Id. at 262. Consistent with this, he
distinguished between (1) “langue” as an “abstract system of rules and conventions of a
signifying system [that] is independent of, and pre-exists, individual users” and (2) “parole,” which “refers to concrete instances of [language’s] use.” Id. at 252. As I see semiotics
and language as living (even though they carry potentially challengeable traditions and
ready-made concepts and schemas), I therefore see Saussure’s approach as quite wrong.
300. NÖTH, supra note 8, at 81.
301. Id.
302. I agree with Rorty that: “The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are
not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own—unaided by
the describing activities of human beings—cannot.” RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY,
IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 5 (1989). Similarly, Gadamer claims that language is “the allembracing form of the constitution of the world” and on language “depends the fact that
man has a world at all.” GADAMER, supra note 98, at 440.
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“lifeworld” or “Lebenswelt” as “the world as we actually experience it.”303 As I would define the term, such a lifeworld includes
both the technical as well as the nontechnical.304 It includes interpretive groups that are “nested” within others; thus, the American legal community, for example, “is surrounded by the political
community, the social community, and ultimately the entire interpretive community of American and perhaps international culture.”305 Lifeworlds are therefore complex webs of meaning where
change generally requires justifications acceptable to the appropriate members of the nested communities.306 For example, competent lawyer-members of such complex webs will push back on
claims that “due process” is a meaningless term.
“Umwelt” is “[t]he environment selectively reconstituted and
organized according to the specific needs and interests of the individual organism.”307 Put another way, “Umwelt” is the “environment insofar as an organism is equipped to perceive it” and is
thus “not simply what is objectively there, but only what is perceptually and operationally available to the organism.”308 As to
the relation of Umwelt to Lebenswelt, Deely notes “the specifically human Umwelt” is called by some the Lebenswelt.309

303. See PUTNAM, supra note 33, at 118. Lacking the space to give an extensive history
of the use of this term, I would briefly point back to Husserl. Smith gives useful definitions
in Husserl’s context: “Lebenswelt” is “the life-world, the world of everyday life, the surrounding world as experienced in everyday life” and “life-world” is “the surrounding world
as experienced in everyday life, including ‘spiritual’ or cultural, that is, social, activities.”
DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH, HUSSERL 437 (2007).
304. See CHAÏM PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE
ON ARGUMENTATION 99 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969) (explaining that
beside other linguistic beliefs lie “agreements that are peculiar to the members of a particular discipline, whether it be of scientific or technical, juridical or theological nature.
Such agreements constitute the body of a science or technique”).
305. BENSON, supra note 142, at 74. Thus, Benson also describes Stanley Fish’s notion
“that we all live in ‘interpretive communities’ which are made up of a ‘political, social and
institutional . . . mix’ of constraints on acceptable interpretations.” Id. See also PERELMAN
& OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 304, at 513 (“All language is the language of a community, be this a community bound by biological ties, or by the practice of a common discipline or technique. The terms used, their meaning, their definition, can only be understood
in the context of the habits, ways of thought, methods, external circumstances, and traditions known to the users of those terms.”).
306. See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 304, at 513 (“A deviation from
usage requires justification.”).
307. DEELY, supra note 49, at 59–60.
308. COLAPIETRO, supra note 297, at 201.
309. DEELY, supra note 49, at 60.
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According to Deely, the Umwelt “depends upon and corresponds to an Innenwelt.”310 An Innenwelt is a “cognitive map, developed within each individual” that “enables the individual to
find its way in the environment and insert itself into a network of
communication, interest, and livelihood shareable especially with
the several other individuals of its own kind.”311
IV. Charity and Related Notions
Consistent with rational interaction, the Principle of Speaker
Meaning assumes that speakers acting in good faith wish to
speak relevantly in the speech situation at hand.312 That is, they
assume that speakers acting in good faith by definition wish to
speak in a way that “can be interpreted as contributing to the
conversational [or other] goals” of the speaker or hearer.313 Consistent with this, the Principle of Speaker Meaning assumes that,
if a speaker wishes to be relevant, she by definition would not
generally intend to speak wrongly, irrationally, or incoherently,
even if her words or other signs could be interpreted as wrong, irrational, or incoherent.314 This leads us to a principle of balance
or charity that generally infers a rational and coherent meaning
unless we have reasons to believe otherwise.315
V. The Pre-Socratics to Peirce: Semeion, Symbolum, Signum, and
Icon
Semiotics has an ancient pedigree. Tracing its lines in simplest
of terms, one can note the ancient Greek fascination with the indexical. Pre-Socratics such as Parmenides and Heraclitus under310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 27 (1989).
313. CRUSE, supra note 131, at 419 (quoting G.N. LEECH, PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMATICS
(1983)).
314. See DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 27 (1984);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to
an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect.”).
315. As Kent Greenawalt nicely tells us: “What I would hope from an interpreter [who
has found statements that seem contradictory or at odds with the remainder of a piece] is
that if she could figure out which statement did fit my overall position best and which reflected a lapse in how I have expressed myself, she would say, ‘Greenawalt probably
means X (or would think X) though one of his sentences points in a different direction.’”
GREENAWALT, supra note 196, at 82.
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stood the Greek term “semeion,” or sign, in the sense of evidence,
or “tekmerion,” which explains why Hippocrates focused on symptoms as signs of diseases.316 In addition to this indexical understanding of “semeion” (whose paradigm “was a medical symptom”
such as “spots”),317 one also encounters “symbolos” used for sentences and words.318 Both the index and the symbol securely fell
under the umbrella of “sign” once St. Augustine famously used
“signum” to include “both the evidential signs of the Greeks and
words as linguistic signs used in communication.”319 Further filling out sign types, St. Bonaventura and others explored iconic
signs.320 Peirce designed his subsequent “classification of signs into icons, indices, and symbols . . . to incorporate the principal
types of signs discussed in the tradition he inherited.”321 Thus,
lawyers who use and appreciate semiotics today stand on the
shoulders of giants from the pre-Socratics to Peirce and beyond.
Unfortunately, I lack space to explore historical semiotics in more
detail here, but hope this summary will entice readers to explore
more such history on their own.322

316. See CLARKE, supra note 10, at 2–3, 11–13.
317. COLAPIETRO, supra note 297, at 177–78
318. CLARKE, supra note 10, at 3. But see COLAPIETRO, supra note 297, at 177–78 (noting that “this distinction between sign and symbol was in ancient Greek usage not always
clearly or consistently drawn”). It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore whether, for
example, passages of Aristotle may have used “symbola” and “semeia” interchangeably.
See id. at 15.
319. CLARKE, supra note 10, at 3, 23.
320. Id. at 4–5, 34–35, 41–43.
321. Id. at 5.
322. Those who are especially ambitious may wish to start with JOHN DEELY, FOUR
AGES OF UNDERSTANDING: THE FIRST POSTMODERN SURVEY OF PHILOSOPHY FROM ANCIENT
TIMES TO THE TURN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Marcel Danesi et al. eds., 2001). This
tome explores “preliminaries to the notion of sign; the development of the notion itself;
forgetfulness of the notion; and recovery and advance of the notion” in the long history of
Western philosophy. Id. at xxx.

